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Summary 
Risk and social preferences are the fundamental blocks in 
behavioral economics. The three essays in this dissertation study people’s 
risk and social preferences from an empirical and experimental 
perspective. We use biological data, in addition to observable choice data 
and field data, to investigate the determinants of risk and social 
preferences as well as factors that may influence people’s behavior in 
several decision making settings. 
In Essay 1, we examine how the level of serotonin receptor 2A 
(HTR2A) gene expression in blood influences people’s risk attitude elicited 
in incentivized decision making tasks. We estimate structural models of 
prospect theory, and show that HTR2A is associated with the loss 
aversion parameter. The additional results of association between HTR2A 
and two personality measures Neuroticism as well as Harm Avoidance 
gave further support for the main finding. Finally we validated the blood 
genomics approach by showing that Single Nucleotide Polymorphism 
(SNP) variation is correlated with overall HTR2A expression. 
In Essay 2, we investigate the rice culture hypothesis using the 
observed choice behavior for several experimental economics games in 
China. It has been proposed (Talhelm et al., 2014) that a history of rice 
farming makes cultures more interdependent while wheat farming makes 
cultures more independent, and that these longstanding agricultural 
	   viii	  
practices continue to influence cultures into the modern era. We find that 
the difference of cooperative behavior in the public goods game is 
explained by the extent of rice culture locally, proxied by the proportion of 
land used for rice farming. The rice culture theory is further corroborated in 
examining non-choice data relating to cooperativeness from a national 
representative survey data, China Family Panel Studies.  
Essay 3 studies behavior in a two-stage matching pennies game 
where players face both objective risk and strategic uncertainty. We 
examine the effect of varying stake size in an experimental setting and 
show that the observed stake-size effect can be compatible with 
equilibrium behavior derived from recursive expected utility theory or 
quantal response model, but not from a standard expected utility 
specification. 
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Chapter 1 
Peripheral Serotonin Receptor 2A (HTR2A) Gene 
Expression and Financial Risk Preferences:  
Association with Loss Aversion, Anxiety-Related 
Personality Traits and Polymorphism1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Across lifespans as individuals, and as a species, humans from 
their very beginnings on the savannahs of East Africa have been faced 
with decisions, which invariably involve some risk. Indeed decision-making 
under risk to this day is ubiquitous in our daily life. Some people invest in 
risky financial markets weighing the chance of gain and loss whereas 
other keep their money in low yielding bonds and bank deposits. Some 
people go for the longshot and bet on the state lottery but also buy 
insurance to avoid the low risk of rare events such as earthquakes. Facing 
these decisions, people vary greatly in their risk attitude. Some of us avoid 
risks if at all possible, whereas others are risk prone seeking out risky 
financial investment and the longshot gamble. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This is a joint work with Mikhail Monakhov, Poh San Lai, Soo Hong Chew, and Richard 
Ebstein. We thank Anne Chong, Zhang Xing, and Tang Rong for assistance in data 
collection, Mikhail Monakhov, Aileen Pang Yu Wen, Lye Hui Jen, Xiong Gaogao, Zhu 
Qingdi and Ping Yuan – for assistance in DNA extraction and genotyping, Roy Chen, 
Song Changcheng, and Zhong Songfa for insightful comments and suggestions in the 
data analysis. This study was supported by grants from AXA Research Fund ("The 
Biology of Decision Making under risk"), John Templeton Foundation (ID: 21240), 
Singapore Ministry of Education (“The Genetic, Neuroimaging and Behavioral Study of 
Human Decision Making”) and National University of Singapore (“Decision Making Under 
Urbanization: A Neurobiological and Experimental Economics Approach” and Start-Up 
grants to R.P.E. and S.H.C.). 
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To understand such complex choice behaviors under risk, several 
generations of social scientists have developed theories intended to 
capture the common features of decision-making but also accommodating 
the widespread observed individual differences in people’s behavior. The 
most important of these theories is expected utility theory developed by 
John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern (1944). The theory assigns a 
utility number to each possible outcome in a gamble, and adds each 
gamble by weighing the probability of its occurrence. It uses an index of 
curvature in the utility function to measure individual differences in risk 
attitude. The theory is widely accepted in social sciences, and has found 
numerous applications. However, accumulating empirical evidence such 
as the Allais Paradox (Maurice Allais, 1953), challenged the expected 
utility theory as a complete explanation of real-life human choice behavior. 
Several non-expected utility theories (Chris Starmer, 2000) have emerged 
as alterative hypotheses and among the most important and influential is 
prospect theory (PT). Kahneman and Tversky (Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky, 1979, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 1992) 
proposed in prospect theory to include loss aversion and probability 
weighting towards a deeper understanding of human decision-making. 
Prospect theory has generated a vast literature enabling a fuller 
appreciation of choice behavior under risk. 
More recently, studies of financial risk attitude have taken a 
biological turn and explanations at the neural level (J. C. Dreher, 2007, M. 
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Hsu et al., 2005, B. Knutson and P. Bossaerts, 2007, B. Knutson and S. 
M. Greer, 2008, S. M. Tom et al., 2007, S. Zhong et al., 2012) have been 
sought towards a richer understanding of the brain regions underpinning 
decision-making. Many of these later investigations have leveraged 
behavioral economic tasks coupled with neural imaging and neurogenetic 
approaches spawning two emerging disciplines, neuroeconomics (C. F. 
Camerer, 2007, G. Loewenstein et al., 2008, R.P. Montague, 2007) and 
more recently, genoeconomics (D. J. Benjamin et al., 2012, DJ Benjamin 
et al., 2007, R. P. Ebstein et al., 2010, A. Navarro, 2009). Neurogenetic 
approaches to better understand financial decision-making have 
provisionally identified elements of dopaminergic (A. Dreber and C. L. 
Apicella, 2009, C. Frydman et al., 2011, C. M. Kuhnen and J. Y. Chiao, 
2009) and serotonergic (L. G. Crisan et al., 2009, K. Doya, 2008, C. M. 
Kuhnen and J. Y. Chiao, 2009, C. M. Kuhnen et al., 2013) neural 
transmission as likely playing a role in choice behavior involving risk. 
These neurogenetic approaches have tentatively identified 
candidate genes such as the dopamine receptor type 4 (DRD4) (A. Dreber 
and C. L. Apicella, 2009, C. M. Kuhnen and J. Y. Chiao, 2009), the 
serotonin transporter (SLC6A4) (C. M. Kuhnen, G. R. Samanez-Larkin and 
B. Knutson, 2013) and monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) (C. Frydman, C. 
Camerer, P. Bossaerts and A. Rangel, 2011, S. Zhong et al., 2009a) as 
contributing to financial risk attitude. However, given the moderate 
heritability of most complex traits, in which environment plays an important 
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role, the sole pursuit of genetic markers alone may fail to reveal the 
fullness of phenotypic variance (T. A. Manolio et al., 2009, M. H. van 
Ijzendoorn et al., 2011). A complimentary approach is to measure 
biomarkers (D. S. Tylee et al., 2013) in accessible tissues such as blood. 
Gene expression, which reflects both hereditable and environmental 
influence, is a particularly attractive target. Measurement of mRNA levels 
is likely to capture more of the phenotypic variance, both genomic and 
epigenetic than a unitary gene based approach. Most importantly, 
expression levels of many genes show good correspondence between 
peripheral blood and brain (I. S. Kohane and V. I. Valtchinov, 2012, B. 
Rollins et al., 2010, P. F. Sullivan et al., 2006, D. S. Tylee, D. M. 
Kawaguchi and S. J. Glatt, 2013, C. H. Woelk et al., 2011). These 
considerations have catalyzed an increasing number of investigations 
demonstrating a relationship between peripheral transcription of both 
specific candidate genes as well as whole genome expression and many 
behavioral syndromes (M. Ayalew et al., 2012, Stephen J. Glatt et al., 
2012, Stephen J. Glatt et al., 2013, S. M. Kurian et al., 2011, Y. Kuwano et 
al., 2011, H. Le-Niculescu et al., 2007a, H. Le-Niculescu et al., 2009, H. 
Le-Niculescu et al., 2007b, D. Mehta et al., 2011, M. Uddin et al., 2010, G. 
Ursini et al., 2011, Z. Yi et al., 2012). Indeed, so-called ‘blood genomics’ is 
becoming an important tool in dissecting complex behaviors. However, no 
studies to our knowledge have yet leveraged blood genomics towards 
understanding financial decision-making.  
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In the influential article of P. F. Sullivan, C. Fan and C. M. Perou 
(2006), the authors cautiously note that gene expression in blood “is 
neither perfectly correlated and useful nor perfectly uncorrelated and 
useless with gene expression in multiple brain tissues”. They suggest that 
a circumspect employment of mRNA measurements in blood may index 
gene expression in some brain regions when it is certain that the gene of 
interest is expressed in both tissues. One of the genes specifically noted 
by them is the serotonin 2A (5-HT2A) receptor (HTR2A). HTR2A is 
expressed in both prefrontal cortex and whole blood suggesting that 
measurement of whole blood HTR2A mRNA levels would be a good 
surrogate for brain expression. The 5-HT2A receptor has been the focus of 
keen interest in human behavioral studies including studies of 
schizophrenia (B. H. Ebdrup et al., 2011), borderline personality disorder 
(U. W. Preuss et al., 2001), mood disorders (L. Gu et al., 2013),suicidal 
behavior (N. Antypa et al., 2013) and aggression (Sophie da Cunha-Bang 
et al., 2013). Evidence from a variety of sources especially links 5-HT2A to 
schizophrenia. For example, 5-HT2A receptors have been a suggested as 
targets for atypical neuroleptic drugs (H. Y. Meltzer, 2012, T. A. Mestre et 
al., 2013); dysregulated 5-HT2A receptor regulation as well as mRNA 
synthesis has been observed in schizophrenia (A. L. Lopez-Figueroa et 
al., 2004, C. Muguruza et al., 2013); receptors mediates the hallucinogenic 
effects of psilocybin (M. Kometer et al., 2013); and a meta-analysis of 
HTR2A polymorphisms suggests association with schizophrenia (G. Blasi 
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et al., 2013, L. Gu, J. Long, Y. Yan, Q. Chen, R. Pan, X. Xie, X. Mao, X. 
Hu, B. Wei and L. Su, 2013).  Beyond the evidence linking this receptor to 
abnormal behavior there are good reasons to expect that 5-HT2A also has 
an important role in normal behavior including financial decision-making.  
Firstly, the 5-HT2A receptors are important in the regulation of brain 
dopamine (DA) transmission particularly in the mesocorticoaccumbens DA 
pathway, which originates in DA somata of the ventral tegmental area 
(VTA) and terminates in the nucleus accumbens (NAc) and prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) (M. J. Bubar and K. A. Cunningham, 2006). This system is 
crucial in reinforcement learning and brain reward pathways. 5-HT2A 
receptors are mainly located post-synaptically and they provide stimulatory 
influence upon DA mesocorticoaccumbens output (M. J. Bubar and K. A. 
Cunningham, 2006). Secondly, 5-HT2A receptors are located in the medial 
(m)PFC where they play a crucial role in amygdala regulation (P. M. 
Fisher et al., 2009). Thirdly, 5-HT2A receptors have been directly observed 
in the amygdala itself (A. J. McDonald and F. Mascagni, 2007) and a 
polymorphic variant of the HTR2A receptor gene has been reported to 
modulate amygdala response to negative affective facial stimuli (B. T. Lee 
and B. J. Ham, 2008).  
The overall importance of serotonin in decision-making (N. D. Daw 
et al., 2002, K. Doya, 2008) coupled with the vital role of 5-HT2A receptors 
in regulating not only serotonergic but also dopaminergic 
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neurotransmission in relevant brain regions discussed above, positions 
transcription of this gene to play a vital role in contributing to individual 
differences in risk attitude. In the current study we examined as a proxy for 
brain expression levels of HTR2A mRNA in blood from 205 university 
students, and compared the transcription of this gene to students’ choices 
on 5 behavioral economic tasks designed to measure risk attitude. 
Notably, we used structural models across these five risk tasks to extract 
the risk phenotype for the genetic analysis. Additionally, as a further check 
of the ecological validity of HTR2A mRNA as a proxy for choice behavior 
we also examined the relationship between this measure and personality 
traits using the neuroticism in Big Five and Harm Avoidance in the 
Temperament Character Index or TCI (C.R. Cloninger et al., 1994). 
Plausibly both risk attitude and personality would also be expected to 
correlate with HRT2A gene expression.  
1.2 Materials and Methods 
1.2.1 Experimental Tasks 
From 2010 to 2011, we conducted a large-scale behavioral 
experiment to study people's decision-making behavior at the National 
University of Singapore. All the risk choices follow the rubrics of 
experimental economics and are incentivized with money and transparent 
to the participant. Altogether we have 5 tasks that are directly related with 
risk (please refer to 1.5.1 Appendix A for the detailed experimental 
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instructions). We denote them from A1 to A5, which record people's binary 
choices in the moderate gain domain, the moderate loss domain, the 
longshot gain domain, the longshot loss domain, and the mixture of gain 
and loss domains respectively. For each task there are 10 choices, while 
in each choice the subject chooses between a two-outcome lottery (Option 
A) and a certain amount of money (Option B). The Table 1.1 summarizes 
these choices.  
Table 1.1 Choices in the Five Tasks 
 
 
1.2.2 Lab Procedures for DNA Genotyping and Gene Expression  
Blood samples were collected by venipuncture, into EDTA tubes. 
DNA was extracted using QIAamp DNA Blood Midi Kit (Quiagen). SNPs 
were genotyped using HumanOmniExpress‐12 v1.0 DNA Analysis Kit 
(Illumina Inc., San Diego, CA) in the Genome Institute of Singapore. 
Task Option A Option B 
 Probability 1 Prize 1 Probability 2 Prize 2 Certainty 
A1 50% $60 50% $0 $15 ~ $35 
A2 50% -$15 50% $0 $-8 ~ $-6.4 
A3 1% $200 99% $0 $0.5 ~ $9 
A4 2% -$30 98% $0 $-2 ~ $-0.1 
A5 50% $30 50% -$16 $-3 ~ $10 
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For extraction of RNA, blood samples were collected into Tempus 
tubes and total RNA was extracted using Tempus™ Spin RNA Isolation 
Kit (Applied Biosystems). cDNA was generated using QuantiTect Reverse 
Transcription kit (Quiagen) and quantified with Quant-iT OliGreen ssDNA 
Kit (Invitrogen). Gene expression was measured in Sequenom laboratory 
(Brisbane, Australia), using competitive PCR and MassARRAY technology. 
Assays were run in quadruplicates, with 6-log dynamic range titration 
curve. To select reference genes for normalization, expression levels of 12 
housekeeping genes were measured in 44 samples. Based on a 
GeNORM analysis, TATA Box Binding Protein (TBP), Fumarate hydratase 
(FH), and Lactate dehydrogenase A (LDHA) were identified as being the 
most stably expressed. Expression values of HTR2A were normalized 
relative to expression of TBP, FH and LDHA, using geometric mean 
approach as described in (J. Vandesompele et al., 2002).  
1.3 Results 
1.3.1 Data 
There are 205 subjects in our sample. The switching point in each 
of the 5 tasks is a simple measure of risk attitudes. For example, the 
number 3 in A1 indicates that the subject chooses the lottery in the first 3 
choices, and switches to the various certain payoffs in the later 7 choices. 
Hence when bigger numbers indicate that the subject is less risk averse. 
In this paper, a simple risk measure is the switching point in each task, 
and HTR2A is the log of the concentration of HTR2A mRNA in blood. The 
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HTR2A concentration is measured as number of molecules of mRNA 
(messenger RNA) of gene HTR2A in the sample of total RNA (RNA from 
all genes including HTR2A) extracted from blood. Higher number of mRNA 
molecules corresponds to higher gene expression viz. more active gene. 
The variable "Female" is a dummy variable with "1" denoting female 
subjects, while "0" meaning male subjects. The following Table 1.2 is the 
descriptive statistics on the main variables in this study. 
Table 1.2 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A1 205 5.14 2.75 0 10 
A2 200 6.56 2.98 0 10 
A3 201 5.82 3.17 0 10 
A4 204 6.48 3.75 0 10 
A5 165 4.72 3.23 0 10 
HTR2A 205 2.96 0.95 -0.891 4.92 
Female 205 0.47 0.50 0 1 
 
The switching points reveal a fourfold risk pattern in Table 1.3. In 
Task A1, we can infer that 74.6% of the subjects are strictly risk averse, 
and the remaining 25.4% are risk neutral or risk loving. This suggests that 
on average our subjects are risk averse in the moderate gain domain. On 
the contrary, in Task A2 there are only 14% of the subjects are risk 
averse, which suggests that on average subjects are risk loving in the 
moderate loss domain. In Task A3, 74.1% of the subjects are risk neutral 
or risk loving, and this suggests that many subjects prefer to buy risky 
lotteries in the longshot gain domain. In Task A4, 39.7% of the subjects 
are risk averse, which has much higher proportion than those in Task A2. 
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This means subjects are more risk averse when they faced with a small 
probability of losing money. Overall the pattern from Task A1 to Task A4 is 
similar to the fourfold risk pattern described by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992). Hence, the use of prospect theory to interpret our results makes 
good sense and appears an eminently appropriate strategy in the current 
study. 
Table 1.3 Switching Points in the Five Tasks 
 




































Observation 205 200 201 204 165 
 
1.3.2 Econometric Models 
The above approach which separately examines each risk task 
has several shortcomings: (1) the measure of risk attitudes using switch 
point is coarse and, importantly, is not directly related with the parameters 
important in utility theories; (2) an underlying risk attitude named loss 
aversion is not captured by separately analyzing each distinct risk task 
and (3) we cannot quantitatively evaluate the impact of HTR2A gene 
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expression on people's risk choices. However, the structural estimation 
approach, which enables combining all 5-risk tasks into a single economic 
model, crucially will generate an estimation of the deep parameters 
represented in utility functions. 
Our experimental tasks involve both loss and gain decisions, which 
leads to a natural reference point. According to Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman (1992), we assume the value function over the certain outcome 
x has the following power function:  
𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥! , 𝑖𝑓  𝑥 ≥ 0−𝜆(−𝑥)  ! , 𝑖𝑓  𝑥 < 0.     (1) 
Here α is the parameter of the utility function curvature, λ is the 
parameter for loss aversion, and x is the lottery prize in the experiment. 
This utility function has the property of constant relative aversion (CRRA), 
so α <1 means risk loving, α =1 means risk neutral, and α >1 means risk 
averse. The identification of the loss aversion parameter λ comes from the 
mixed lottery Task A5. 
It also has a probability weighting function that adopt the following 
form: 𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑝!/[𝑝! + (1− 𝑝)!]!/!    (2) 
Since from Task A1 to A5 the probabilities of the lotteries vary from 
moderate to longshot, it provides the identification of 𝛾. 
The subjects evaluate the lottery and the certainty money, and 
make the choice according to the function: 
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∆𝑃𝑇 = 𝑃𝑇! − 𝑃𝑇! = 𝑤(𝑝 𝑘 )×𝑢 𝑘! − 𝑢 𝑐 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑘 = 1,2. 
To account for the random error in the real choice data, we add a 
stochastic item μ into the log likelihood function: 𝑙𝑛𝐿 α, λ, γ, µμ,X = 𝑙𝑛𝐿!!  = [(𝑙𝑛𝛷! (∆𝑃𝑇/µμ)×𝐼(𝑦! = 1))+ ln  (1− (∆𝑃𝑇/µμ)  )×𝐼(𝑦! = 0))], 
where Φ(.) is the CDF of the usual logit function, I(.) is the index function, 
yi=1(or 0) indicates the choice of lottery (or certainty) in one task, µμ is a 
noise parameter (John D Hey and Chris Orme, 1994), and X is a vector of 
individual characteristics including gender, age, and HTR2A gene 
expression level. 
In addition, we assume that the loss aversion parameter λ and risk 
aversion parameter α are a linear function of the individual characteristics, 
which identify their impacts to λ and α. 𝜆 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝜆!×𝐻𝑇𝑅2𝐴 + 𝜆!×𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝜆!×𝐴𝑔𝑒      (3) 𝛼 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼!×𝐻𝑇𝑅2𝐴 + 𝛼!×𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛼!×𝐴𝑔𝑒     (4) 
1.3.3 Estimation Results 
We estimated the structural models of prospect theory with 
maximum likelihood estimation2, considering the cases of with and without 
the covariates of HTR2A gene expression, gender, and age. From Table 
1.4, we observe that in equations (1), the constant terms of our main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  We	  used	  STATA	  version	  12	  here.	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parameters α, λ, and γ are all statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficients are reasonable and consistent to the existing literature – the 
loss aversion parameter λ is 1.64 whose magnitude is moderate, and α is 
0.91 which means that the subjects are loss averse. This suggests that 
the prospect theory performs well in our sample. To investigate the impact 
of HTR2A on loss aversion parameter λ and risk aversion parameter α, we 
add HTR2A, gender, and age as the covariates of λ and α. The coefficient 
of HTR2A in λ is positive and marginal significantly different from 0 at the 
10% level (p-value is 0.064), and HTR2A in α is not significantly different 
from 0 (p-value is 0.158). From these results, it is evident that the main 
impact of HTR2A is actually through loss aversion parameter λ.  
We focus on the impact of HTR2A on λ in equation (3), and find 
that HTR2A is also positive and significant at the 10% level (the p-value is 
0.08). We know that the HTR2A has the similar coefficients as those in 
equation (2), and albeit the significance is slightly decreased.3 
This is the most important result to emerge from the structural 
equation modeling viz., the coefficients of HTR2A in λ, which suggests 
that people with higher HTR2A gene expression will be more loss averse. 
In addition, we notice that the "Female" dummy variables for λ in Equation 
(2) and (3) are significant at 5% level, which indicates a gender effect: 
female seems to be more loss averse in our sample. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  In 1.5.2 Appendix B, we demonstrate a reduced form estimation of the five risk tasks 
with the ordered logit regression. The positive association of HTR2A and Task A2 in the 
moderate loss domain confirms the relationship between HTR2A and loss aversion 
parameter in the structural estimation.	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Since there is a strong gender effect in the above estimation, we 
divided the full sample into male and female subsamples. Table 1.5 shows 
that for the female subjects the estimated coefficient of HTR2A on λ is 
0.24, and the it is statistically significant at the 5% level; while for the male 
subject, the estimated coefficient of HTR2A is 0.07, and it is not 
significantly different from 0. This suggests that HTR2A’s impact on loss 
aversion parameter λ mainly goes through the females. 
Table 1.4 Structural Estimation of Prospect Theory 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses clustered at the individual subject level. *** 
means significant at the 1 percent level, ** means significant at the 5 percent level, and * 
means significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
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(.03)   
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 0.89 *** 
(.06) 
Observation 10250 10250 10250 
Log likelihood -6045.12 -5957.40  -5989.80 
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Table 1.5 Structural Estimation by Gender Subsample 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses clustered at the individual subject level. *** 
means significant at the 1 percent level, ** means significant at the 5 percent level, and * 
means significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
1.3.4 Robustness Checks 
(1) Alternative probability weighting functions 
We consider alternative probability weighting functions, and 
examine whether our main results still hold. Drazen Prelec (1998) 






















































































Observation 10250 4800 5450 
Log likelihood -5957.40 -2765.90  -3177.79 
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The Equation (1) in Table 1.6 shows that this new probability 
weighting function fits the model quite well, and the values of λ and α are 
similar with those in Table 1.4. The Equation (2) in Table 1.6 adds the 
covariates, and the coefficient of HTR2A is also similar with the results in 
Table 1.4. This shows that our main results in Table 1.4 in robust to 
Prelec’s alternative probability weighting function. 
Another one is to assume there is no probability weighting, which 
means the following function: 𝑤 𝑝 = 𝑝 
The Equation (3) and (4) in Table 1.6 show that our main results in 
Table 1.4 are still robust to the new model without probability weighing. 
The overall message is that our estimated effect of HTR2A on loss 
aversion parameter λ is not driven by the probability weighting function.  
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Table 1.6 Alternative Probability Weighting Functions 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses clustered at the individual subject level. *** 
means significant at the 1 percent level, ** means significant at the 5 percent level, and 
* means significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
(2) Alternative risk tasks 
 
If we only use Task A1, A2, and A5, we could still identify the 
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 1.11 *** 
(.07) 
 1.08 *** 
(.07) 
Observation 10250 10250 10250 10250 
Log likelihood -6032.64 -5944.79 -6198.91 -6120.06 
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in Table 1.7 we show the results of structural estimation of prospect theory 
using Task A1, A2, and A5. Indeed, the coefficients of λ are similar with 
those in Table 1.4 and Table 1.6. 
Table1.7 Alternative Risk Tasks 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses clustered at the individual subject level. *** 
means significant at the 1 percent level, ** means significant at the 5 percent level, 
and * means significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
1.3.5 Evidence from Personality Traits 












































































































Observation 6150 6150 6150 
Log likelihood -3369.54 -3369.54 -3441.04 
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To check the ecological validity, domain specificity and 
generalizability of the relationship between risk phenotype captured in 
behavioral economic tasks and HTR2A expression, we next examine a 
‘loss side’ phenotype captured in pencil and paper measured personality 
traits including Neuroticism in the Big Five scale and Harm Avoidance in 
the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI) scale. The Big Five 
personality scale includes five factors - openness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. Neuroticism measures the 
tendency to experience unpleasant emotions easily, such as anger, 
anxiety, depression, and vulnerability. High Neuroticism score is related 
with low tolerance for stress or aversive stimuli. The TCI scale includes 
five factors: novelty seeking, harm avoidance, reward dependence, 
persistence, self-directedness, cooperativeness, and self-transcendence. 
Harm avoidance measures anticipatory worry, fear of uncertainty, shyness, 
and fatigability. We collected the personality and demographic information 
in questionnaires after the behavioral experiments. Indeed, we observe 
significant correlation (coefficient=1.48, p=0.03, observations = 188, with 
control of gender, age) between HTR2A gene expression and Neuroticism 
(Figure 1.1). In addition, we also find that HTR2A gene expression is 
positively correlated (coefficient=2.25, p=0.112, observations = 170, with 
control of gender, age) with TCI Harm Avoidance (Figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.1 The Scatter Points of Neuroticism and HTR2A 
 
 




(2) Anxiety related personality traits and loss aversion 
Based on the previous results showing a correlation between 
Neuroticism as well as Harm Avoidance with HTR2A expression, we also 
examined the correlation between these two anxiety-related personality 
traits and each subject’s predicted loss aversion parameter (λ). As shown 




























-2 0 2 4 6
HTR2A
	   22	  
correlated with the loss aversion parameter (λ) derived from the prospect 
theory model in Table 4 with NEO neuroticism (in OLS linear regression, 
the slope coefficient=10.50, p=0.001) and TCI Harm Avoidance (in OLS 
linear regression, the slope coefficient=10.17, p=0.089).  
 
Figure 1.3 The Scatter Points of NEO Neuroticism and λ 
 
 
Figure 1.4 The Scatter Points of Harm Avoidance and λ 
 
 
1.3.6 HTR2A Expression and Genetic Variation 
The HTR2A gene contains 3 exons and 2 introns and is 
characterized by single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) across the gene 
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region. As shown in Figure 1.5, a number of SNPs are significantly 
associated with gene expression in blood cells. 
Figure 1.5 LD Plot of HRT2A eQTLs in Blood 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the association between HTR2A gene expression and SNPs in 
HTR2A region. Every blue dot represents one SNP. The coordinates of dots on X-axis 
show location of SNPs on the chromosome. The coordinates on Y-axis show negative 
logarithm of p-value from tests of association between SNPs and HTR2A expression 
level (high values of -log(p) correspond to statistically significant associations). Upper 
dashed line indicates conventional significance threshold p=0.05. The location of HTR2A 
sequence that encodes HTR2A protein is shown immediately below x-axis. The heatmap 
on the lower pane shows extent of pair-wise LD (linkage disequilibrium) between SNPs. 
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Of particular interest is one SNP rs6311 which is located in the 5’ 
untranslated region of the gene. Cis-eQTL analyses demonstrated rs6311 
modulates expression of the previously unannotated extended 5’ UTR in 
human cortex (Ryan M Smith et al., 2013). Importantly, as shown in Figure 
6 the direction of effect for the three genotypes of rs6311 in our blood 
samples is the same as in human cortex (Ryan M Smith, Audrey C Papp, 
Amy Webb, Cara L Ruble, Leanne M Munsie, Laura K Nisenbaum, Joel E 
Kleinman, Barbara K Lipska and Wolfgang Sadee, 2013). The similar 
direction of effect for both HTR2A expressed in blood and in human cortex 
observed here in a large Han Chinese sample strengthens the use of so-
called ‘blood genomics’ as a proxy for brain expression for some, if not the 
majority of central nervous system expressed genes (E. Gardiner et al., 
2012, H. Le-Niculescu, M. J. McFarland, S. Mamidipalli, C. A. Ogden, R. 
Kuczenski, S. M. Kurian, D. R. Salomon, M. T. Tsuang, J. I. Nurnberger, Jr. 
and A. B. Niculescu, 2007b, Y. Tang et al., 2004).  
To further explore the relationship between eQTLs and HRT2A, 
and minimize the issue of multiple SNP testing, we carried out a principle 
components analysis (PCA) of all eQTL SNPs in this gene region. There 
are 10 SNPs in the HTR2A gene sequence, which are associated with 
HTR2A gene expression. For each of these SNPs we calculated a 
numerical score: number of minor alleles in a genotype (i.e., if SNP is A/G 
substitution and A is minor allele, then AA is takes value of 2, AG - 1 and 
GG - 0). Then we carried out a PCA analysis of these scores. PCA shows 
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that there are 3 components with eigenvalue above 1 (that is, each of 
these 3 components explains variance in the data better than original SNP 
scores do). We then ran a regression with HTR2A expression as 
dependent variable, and 3 major principal components (and sex) as 
independent variables. The first component is significantly associated with 
gene expression and explains 58% of the variance. The Scree plot is 
shown in Figure 1.7. 
We also examined the HRT2A SNPs for association with loss 
aversion parameter λ in the full sample. Of the 72 SNPs tested only one 
SNP rs1328685 with a nominal p value of 0.00013 survived the Bonferroni 
correction for multiple testing. Interestingly, this SNP has predicted 
functionality (YJ Ben-Efraim et al., 2013, F. Piva et al., 2010) albeit we do 
not observe effects of this SNP on expression in blood.  
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Using a phenotype derived from structural estimation of five 
behavioral economic tasks based on incentivized gambles and designed 
to measure risk attitude, we observe a statistically significant correlation 
between HTR2A gene expression in blood and loss aversion. Greater 
peripheral HTR2A gene expression is correlated with greater loss aversion. 
Correlation is not, of course, causation. However, one of the main 
advantages of leveraging genetic data towards understanding the neural 
mechanisms underlying decision-making is that genetic variation is usually 
exogenous. In the current investigation, we mainly focus on the causal 
relationship between gene expression and risk attitude, and the coefficient 
of the relevant parameters is the consistent estimator under exogenous 
HTR2A variation. The correlation between a serotonin receptor expression 
and loss aversion is also theoretically plausible based on a neurochemical 
model we have proposed for valuation sensitivity over gains and losses (S. 
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Zhong et al., 2009b). In that model, we specifically indicated that serotonin 
modulates the sensitivity towards valuation of losses whereas dopamine 
modulates sensitivity towards valuation of gains. Regarding serotonin, our 
hypothesis is that 5-HT tone modulates sensitivity towards incremental 
loss and the higher the 5-HT tone, the higher the sensitivity towards 
incremental loss. We now further suggest, based on the current findings, 
the notion that increased expression of HTR2A leads to higher 
serotonergic tone, which in turn is correlated with higher loss aversion.  
Many of the choices we make from starting a new business to 
investing in the stock market involve the chance of gaining or losing 
relative to our current position or status quo. Most people having to 
choose between keeping what we have or possibly losing money on a new 
venture, are risk averse. Indeed, laboratory experiments involving gambles 
for real money show that losses loom larger than gains unless the amount 
that can be gained is twice the amount that one can lose (Amos Tversky 
and Daniel Kahneman, 1992). Loss aversion has a very clean meaning in 
economic models, as we have discussed above, and there is a 
considerable challenge in translating this mathematical clarity to 
psychological and neural constructs. Nevertheless, evidence is 
accumulating regarding the neurochemical substrate of this phenomenon. 
In a recent review by (H. Takahashi, 2012), he discusses recent fMRI 
studies that have focused on the neural substrate of loss aversion (B. De 
Martino et al., 2010, P. Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013, P. Sokol-Hessner et al., 
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2009, S. M. Tom, C. R. Fox, C. Trepel and R. A. Poldrack, 2007). On the 
whole, regions involved in emotional processing the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC), the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC), the amygdala, the insula and 
striatal structures, are implicated in loss aversion. As he notes (H. 
Takahashi, 2012), the imaging evidence suggests that loss aversion is 
emotionally loaded which suggests an involvement of serotonergic brain 
pathways and more specifically, the 5-HT2A receptor.   
The 5-HT2A receptor is widely expressed in the prefrontal cortex 
and after 5-HT1A, is the second most common serotonin receptor; it is 
predominantly expressed in pyramidal neurons (M. Amargos-Bosch et al., 
2004). The cortex, ventral striatum, hippocampus, and amygdala are 
highly enriched in HTR2A expression. The cortex has been hypothesized 
as a “topdown” modulator of anxiety-related processes, given the 
extensive interconnections between the cortex and structures such as the 
hippocampus and amygdala. Recent functional imaging data in human 
subjects support this notion(S. Bishop et al., 2004, A. Heinz et al., 2005, J. 
M. Kent et al., 2005). In rodents, the excitatory effects of cortical 5-HT2A 
apparently enhance anxiety (N. V. Weisstaub et al., 2006) as well as 
impulsivity (Catharine A Winstanley et al., 2004). In adult humans, 5-HT2A 
binding is up-regulated in prefrontal cortex of subjects with mood disorders 
(RC Shelton et al., 2009). Notably, 5-HT2A binding is correlated with 
personality traits such as neuroticism (V. G. Frokjaer et al., 2010, Vibe G. 
Frokjaer et al., 2008), which are risk factors for depression. In rodents, 
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genetic deletion of cortical 5-HT2A binding diminished anxiety levels (N. V. 
Weisstaub, M. Zhou, A. Lira, E. Lambe, J. Gonzalez-Maeso, J. P. Hornung, 
E. Sibille, M. Underwood, S. Itohara, W. T. Dauer, M. S. Ansorge, E. 
Morelli, J. J. Mann, M. Toth, G. Aghajanian, S. C. Sealfon, R. Hen and J. A. 
Gingrich, 2006). All of these just mentioned studies argue for a deep 
connection between 5-HT2A and anxiety, a relationship that naturally 
supports a role for this receptor in partially mediating loss aversion. Surely 
anxious people are more prone to feel the pain of losses.  
Altogether, it is a reasonable notion that decision-making takes 
place in the context of the brain’s current and past emotion milieu and 
important recent investigations have shown that emotions indeed influence 
choice behavior(Jennifer S Lerner et al., 2004, Piotr Winkielman et al., 
2005). Some recent studies underscore the role of emotion specifically in 
loss aversion (P. Sokol-Hessner, C. F. Camerer and E. A. Phelps, 2013, P. 
Sokol-Hessner, M. Hsu, N. G. Curley, M. R. Delgado, C. F. Camerer and E. 
A. Phelps, 2009). In the first study (P. Sokol-Hessner, M. Hsu, N. G. 
Curley, M. R. Delgado, C. F. Camerer and E. A. Phelps, 2009) participants 
were on average more aroused indexed by skin conductance response, 
per dollar to losses relative to gains, and the difference in arousal to 
losses versus gains correlated with behavioral loss aversion across 
subjects. In the second ‘follow-up’ study by the same group of 
investigators (P. Sokol-Hessner, C. F. Camerer and E. A. Phelps, 2013) 
they used fMRI and showed that behavioral loss aversion correlates with 
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amygdala activity in response to losses relative to gains. Success in 
regulating loss aversion also correlated with the reduction in amygdala 
responses to losses but not to gains. The current findings demonstrating a 
relationship between HTR2A expression and loss aversion, coupled with 
the importance of 5-HT2A receptors in emotional especially anxiety and 
amygdala regulation, may provide in part the neurochemical underpinning 
for the amygdala response to losses and not to gains (P. Sokol-Hessner, 
C. F. Camerer and E. A. Phelps, 2013).  
An intriguing study of alexithymia (Peter A Bibby and Eamonn 
Ferguson, 2011) further strengthens the connection between emotion and 
financial decision-making specifically loss aversion. Alexithymia is a stable 
individual difference in peoples’ inability to process emotional information 
(R. M. Bagby et al., 1994). Bibby and Ferguson (Peter A Bibby and 
Eamonn Ferguson, 2011) studied loss aversion indexed by gambles as 
well as by the ‘riskless’ endowment effect. It was found that the higher the 
alexithymia score the lower the loss aversion for both riskless and risky 
decisions. These results underscore that loss aversion is to some 
measure driven by ability to process emotional information and in the 
absence of ‘emotion’ people are considerably less sensitive to loss 
aversion. In a second study using a neurogenetic approach, association 
between the serotonin transporter and alexithymia scores was shown (M. 
Kano et al., 2012). Subjects with the s/l or s/s 5-HTTLPR version of the 
serotonin transporter, score lower on the alexithymia scale compared to 
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subjects with the l/l polymorphism. Considering both the Bibby and 
Ferguson’s finding (Peter A Bibby and Eamonn Ferguson, 2011)  and 
those of Kano et al (M. Kano, T. Mizuno, Y. Kawano, M. Aoki, M. 
Kanazawa and S. Fukudo, 2012), they together strengthen the notion that 
subjects with higher synaptic serotonin levels (high 5-HT tone), due to a 
less efficient transporter (short version s/s or s/l), are more sensitive to 
loss aversion.  
Pencil and paper personality measures offer a complementary 
perspective in understanding individual differences in decision-making and 
hence there is considerable interest in the relationship between 
personality traits and choice behavior. These different measures by 
economists and psychologists could ideally be combined towards a 
deeper understanding of human behavior (Lex Borghans et al., 2008).  A 
number of previous studies have reported generally significant but weak 
correlations between personality traits and financial risk preferences (Jon 
Anderson et al., 2011, Anke Becker et al., 2012, A. Rustichini et al., 2012). 
As discussed in the article by Anderson et al (Jon Anderson, Stephen 
Burks, Colin DeYoung and Aldo Rustichini, 2011), attitudes to risk are 
mostly affected by Neuroticism: a higher Neuroticism score is associated 
with a higher aversion to risk and uncertain outcomes.  Overall our results 
in the current investigation where we observe a correlation between the 
loss aversion parameter λ, derived from both EU and PT and anxiety-
related personality traits measured by two widely employed personality 
	   32	  
inventories, the NEO and TCI, are consistent with previous findings 
regarding anxiety-related personality traits and economic risk attitude.   
Importantly, we validated the blood genomics approach by 
showing that SNP variation is correlated with overall HTR2A expression. 
Multiple SNPs in the HTR2A gene region are associated with gene 
expression. To minimize the issue of multiple testing, we combined the 
SNP variation using PCA and show that the first principal component, 
which explains more than 50% of the variance, is significantly associated 
with overall HTR2A expression. One particular SNP which has been the 
focus of considerable study, rs6311 – also known as (-1438G>A), showed 
a similar genotype direction with respect to mRNA levels as has been 
observed in human cortex (Ryan M Smith, Audrey C Papp, Amy Webb, 
Cara L Ruble, Leanne M Munsie, Laura K Nisenbaum, Joel E Kleinman, 
Barbara K Lipska and Wolfgang Sadee, 2013). In both cortex and blood 
the G allele additively increases overall gene expression.    
Interestingly, rs1328685 was significantly associated with the loss 
aversion parameter λ following stringent Bonferroni correction. In the study 
of Smith et al (Ryan M Smith, Audrey C Papp, Amy Webb, Cara L Ruble, 
Leanne M Munsie, Laura K Nisenbaum, Joel E Kleinman, Barbara K 
Lipska and Wolfgang Sadee, 2013) significant allelic expression 
imbalance in human cortex was observed for two SNPs in the extended 
HTR2A 5’UTR, rs1328685 and rs6311 albeit the evidence was strongest 
for rs6311. However, in the current study whereas rs6311 was associated 
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with greater HTR2A blood expression, rs1328685 was not. Nevertheless, 
according to Piva et al (F. Piva, M. Giulietti, B. Nardi, C. Bellantuono and 
G. Principato, 2010) this SNP is a possible site for two transcription factors, 
GR  and HNF4. The presence of the minor allele results in loss of the TF 
binding site for both rs1328685 and rs6311. GR is the receptor for the 
glucocorticoid receptor and HNF4 is a TF for many metabolic enzymes 
and proteins. It was reported that HTR2A is up-regulated in chronic fatigue 
syndrome through allele-specific expression modulated by transcription 
factors at critical sites in its promoter: an E47 binding site at position -
1,438, (created by the A-allele of rs6311 polymorphism), a glucocorticoid 
receptor (GR) binding site encompassing a CpG at position -1,420, and 
Sp1 binding at CpG methylation site -1,224 (V. R. Falkenberg et al., 2011). 
Moreover, subchronic glucocorticoid treatment upregulates 5-HT2A 
receptor density in human blood samples (Anders Kling et al., 2013). We 
suggest the notion that the impact of the rs1328685 SNP on loss aversion 
may be mediated early in development when the serotonin system has 
been shown to be sensitive to glucocorticoid levels (Delia M. Vázquez et 
al., 2012). These observations suggest that a worthwhile avenue for future 
research is the study of epigenetic signatures on the HRT2A gene which 
have been shown to regulate its expression (V. R. Falkenberg, B. M. 
Gurbaxani, E. R. Unger and M. S. Rajeevan, 2011). The significant 
association we observe between rs1328685 and the loss aversion 
parameter λ may be better understood following methylation analysis of 
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CpG sites in the HRT2A promoter region.  
By combining a blood genomics approach, behavioral economic 
tasks and personality measures in a single study we are able to draw a 
fuller and more nuanced picture of the loss aversion parameter derived by 
structural estimation of prospect theory. Molecular explanations for loss 
aversion, which we provide in this study, provide the proximate 
explanation of the loss aversion construct, viz., ‘how’. What are the 
neurochemical mechanisms underlying this parameter and how does loss 
aversion work at the brain level? Personality psychology provides a 
second level of explanation of the ‘how’ of loss aversion. Roberts et al 
(Brent W Roberts et al., 2007) define personality as “the relatively 
enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that reflect the 
tendency to respond in certain ways under certain circumstances”. We 
reveal in the current investigation an explanation of the ‘how’ not only at 
the most basic level of gene expression but notably extend our 
explanation to a higher construct, personality, and show that anxiety-
related personality traits are correlated both with loss aversion but also 
with HTR2A gene expression. Importantly, HTR2A gene expression links 
the loss aversion parameter to serotonin neural pathways that underlie 
emotional behavior partially explaining how ‘emotion’ impacts financial 
decision-making. For the ultimate explanation of loss aversion and other 
economic biases we might turn to evolutionary theory (Peter Hammerstein 
and Edward H Hagen, 2005, Rose McDermott et al., 2008, Nick Netzer, 
	   35	  
2009). Ultimate explanations are concerned with why a behavior exists – 
does it increase our fitness? A simple evolutionary explanation of loss 
aversion is perhaps described by the adage “a bird in the hand is worth 
two in the bush”. In our hunter gatherer days having made a kill and 
calculating the probability of a second kill, the best bet might be to hold on 
to the just acquired meal and not risk looking for another.  
 The current study has wider implications for understanding both 
the genetic as well as the environmental influences that jointly modulate 
financial decision-making. Although the importance of psychological 
insights in informing economic theory have steadily gained traction 
(Matthew Rabin, 1998), the same cannot be said for molecular genetic 
approaches in social sciences (D. J. Benjamin, D. Cesarini, M. J. van der 
Loos, C. T. Dawes, P. D. Koellinger, P. K. Magnusson, C. F. Chabris, D. 
Conley, D. Laibson, M. Johannesson and P. M. Visscher, 2012, DJ 
Benjamin, CF Chabris, EL Glaeser, V Gudnason, TB Harris, D Laibson, L 
Launer and S Purcell, 2007, E. Charney and W. English, 2012, A. Navarro, 
2009). Some of the thorniest issues in applying molecular genetic 
approaches to complex behaviors are (1) small effect sizes (2) the 
interaction of genes with the environment, G x E and  (3) epistasis or gene 
× gene interactions. We suggest that the approach taken in the current 
study by examining blood expression of a gene also expressed in brain 
overcomes some of the obstacles just cited in applying a neurogenetic 
strategy to revealing underlying mechanisms in economic concepts. 
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HTR2A blood expression is a measure not only of genomic influences but 
also epigenetic modifications of DNA. As defined in a recent review (R. 
Bogdan et al., 2013) “epigenetics refers to cell-specific changes in gene 
expression that are caused by factors (for example, methylation affecting 
gene transcription accessibility) other than the underlying static DNA 
sequence”.  We suggest the notion that blood expression of HTR2A can 
be considered an aggregate measure capturing genetic and epigenetic 
variables that is more informative than simply examining polymorphic 
variations at the level of DNA sequence.  
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1.5 Appendix 
 
1.5.1 Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
 
SET A – Individual Decision Making 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Set A comprises 22 tasks. The first 21 tasks are of the form illustrated in 
the table below. Each lists 10 choices to be made between a fixed Option A and a 
number of different Option B’s. For each row, you are asked to indicate your choice 
by ticking A or B in the final column of the table. The first 21 tasks are of the form 
illustrated in the table below.  
 Option A Option B Decision 
1 A B1 A     B   
2 A B2 A     B   
3 A B3 A     B   
4 A B4 A     B   
5 A B5 A     B   
6 A B6 A     B   
7 A B7 A     B   
8 A B8 A     B   
9 A B9 A     B   
10 A B10 A     B   
You may make your decisions in any order and you may change your 
decisions at any time. Just indicate each revised decision clearly. 
Selection of Section A tasks to be implemented: One out of the first 19 
tasks (selected randomly by you) will be implemented. The final 2 tasks – Task 20 
and Task 21 – will be implemented for two randomly selected 2 participants in the 
room.  
You may now begin. Should you have questions during the experiment, 
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DECISION SHEET A1 
This situation calls for you to guess the color – red or black – of a card 
drawn randomly from a deck of 20 cards, comprising 10 black cards and 10 red 
cards.  
Option A: If you make a correct guess, you receive $60; otherwise, you 
receive nothing. That is: 50% chance of receiving $60 and 50% chance of 
receiving $0. 
The Option B column lists the amounts you will receive for sure if you 
choose this option. 
For each of the 10 decisions in the final column, please tick (√) your 
choice. 
 
 Option A Option B Decision 
1 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $15 for sure A     B   
2 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $19 for sure A     B   
3 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $23 for sure A     B   
4 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $25 for sure A     B   
5 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $27 for sure A     B   
6 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $29 for sure A     B   
7 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $30 for sure A     B   
8 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $31 for sure A     B   
9 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $33 for sure A     B   
10 50% of receiving $60, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $35 for sure A     B   
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DECISION SHEET A2 
This situation calls for you to guess the color – red or black – of a card 
drawn randomly from a deck of 20 cards, comprising 10 black cards and 10 red 
cards.    
Option A: If you make a correct guess, you lose $15; otherwise, you lose 
nothing. That is: 50% chance of losing $15 and 50% chance of losing $0. 
The Option B column lists the amounts you will receive for sure if you 
choose this option. 
For each of the 10 decisions in the final column, please tick (√) your 
choice. 
 
 Option A Option B Decision 
1 50% of losing $15, 50% of losing $0 Losing $8.00 for sure A          B   
2 50% of losing $15, 50% of losing $0 Losing $7.80 for sure A          B   
3 50% of losing $15, 50% of losing $0 Losing $7.60 for sure A          B   
4 50% of losing $15, 50% of losing $0 Losing $7.50 for sure A          B   
5 50% of losing $15, 50% of losing $0 Losing $7.40 for sure A          B   
6 50% of losing $15, 50% of losing $0 Losing $7.20 for sure A          B   
7 50% of losing $15, 50% of losing $0 Losing $7.00 for sure A          B   
8 50% of losing $15, 50% of losing $0 Losing $6.80 for sure A          B   
9 50% of losing $15, 50% of losing $0 Losing $6.60 for sure A          B   
10 50% of losing $15, 50% of losing $0 Losing $6.40 for sure  A          B   
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DECISION SHEET A3 
This situation involves your drawing randomly from a deck of cards 
comprising 9 black cards and 1 red card.  
Option A: If you draw the red card with replacement twice, you receive 
$200. Otherwise, you receive $0. That is: 1% chance of receiving $200 and 99% 
chance of receiving $0.   
The Option B column lists the amounts you will receive for sure if you 
choose this option. 
For each of the 10 decisions in the final column, please tick (√) your 
choice. 
 
 Option A Option B Decision 
1 1% of receiving $200, 99% of receiving $0 Receiving $0.50 for sure A       B   
2 1% of receiving $200, 99% of receiving $0 Receiving $1.00 for sure A       B   
3 1% of receiving $200, 99% of receiving $0 Receiving $1.80 for sure A       B   
4 1% of receiving $200, 99% of receiving $0 Receiving $2.00 for sure A       B   
5 1% of receiving $200, 99% of receiving $0 Receiving $2.20 for sure A       B   
6 1% of receiving $200, 99% of receiving $0 Receiving $3.00 for sure A       B   
7 1% of receiving $200, 99% of receiving $0 Receiving $4.00 for sure A       B   
8 1% of receiving $200, 99% of receiving $0 Receiving $5.50 for sure A       B   
9 1% of receiving $200, 99% of receiving $0 Receiving $7.00 for sure A       B   
10 1% of receiving $200, 99% of receiving $0 Receiving $9.00 for sure A       B   
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DECISION SHEET A4 
This situation involves your drawing one card randomly from a deck of 
cards comprising 49 black cards and 1 red card.  
Option A: If you draw the red card, you lose $30. Otherwise, you lose $0. 
That is: 2% chance of losing $30 and 98% chance of losing $0.   
The Option B column lists 10 loss amounts each corresponding to what 
you will lose for sure if you choose this option. (Notice that the loss amounts are 
displayed in a descending manner.) 
DECISION: For each of the 10 rows, please indicate your decision in the 
final column with a tick (√). 
 
 Option A Option B Decision 
1 2% of losing $30, 98% of losing $0 Losing $2.00 for sure A       B   
2 2% of losing $30, 98% of losing $0 Losing $1.50 for sure A       B   
3 2% of losing $30, 98% of losing $0 Losing $1.20 for sure A       B   
4 2% of losing $30, 98% of losing $0 Losing $1.00 for sure A       B   
5 2% of losing $30, 98% of losing $0 Losing $0.80 for sure A       B   
6 2% of losing $30, 98% of losing $0 Losing $0.70 for sure A       B   
7 2% of losing $30, 98% of losing $0 Losing $0.60 for sure A       B   
8 2% of losing $30, 98% of losing $0 Losing $0.50 for sure A       B   
9 2% of losing $30, 98% of losing $0 Losing $0.30 for sure A       B   
10 2% of losing $30, 98% of losing $0 Losing $0.10 for sure A       B   
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DECISION SHEET A5 
This situation involves your guessing the color – red or black – of a card 
drawn randomly from a deck of 20 cards, comprising 10 black cards and 10 red 
cards.  
Option A: You guess the color – black or red – of a card that you are about 
to draw from the deck of 20 cards. If you make a correct guess, you receive $30; 
otherwise, you lose $16. That is: 50% chance of receiving $30 and 50% chance 
of losing $16. 
The Option B column lists the amounts you can receive or lose for sure if you 
choose this option. 
 
DECISION: For each of the 10 rows, please indicate your decision in the 
final column with a tick (√). 
 
 
 Option A Option B Decision 
1 50% of receiving $30, 50% of losing $16 Losing $3 for sure A      B   
2 50% of receiving $30, 50% of losing $16 Losing $1 for sure A      B   
3 50% of receiving $30, 50% of losing $16 Losing $0 for sure A      B   
4 50% of receiving $30, 50% of losing $16 Receiving $1 for sure A      B   
5 50% of receiving $30, 50% of losing $16 Receiving $2 for sure A      B   
6 50% of receiving $30, 50% of losing $16 Receiving $4 for sure A      B   
7 50% of receiving $30, 50% of losing $16 Receiving $6 for sure A      B   
8 50% of receiving $30, 50% of losing $16 Receiving $7 for sure A      B   
9 50% of receiving $30, 50% of losing $16 Receiving $8 for sure A      B   
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1.5.2 Appendix B: Ordered Logit Regression Results 
 
We use the ordered logit regression analysis to examine the relationship 
between HRT2A expression and risk attitude. The dependent variables in the regressions 
are all integers and large values indicate subjects are more risk prone. Results are shown 
in Table A. 
From Table A, we observe that for Task A1, the coefficient for HTR2A is positive 
and statistically insignificant. For Task A2, the coefficient for HTR2A is also positive and 
statistically significant at p<10% level, which indicates that greater HTR2A gene 
expression is correlated with less risk aversion over moderate loss. For the tasks A3, A4, 
and A5, the coefficients of HTR2A are not significant albeit for A4 and A5 the coefficient 
is negative. 
 
Table A Ordered Logit Regression Results 
Variables A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 
HTR2A 0.196 0.220* 0.205 -0.0343 -0.160 
 
(0.122) (0.120) (0.195) (0.116) (0.120) 
Age 0.0397 -0.0838 0.0304 -0.0128 0.0432 
 
(0.0713) (0.0839) (0.0937) (0.0955) (0.0817) 
Female -0.413 0.528* -0.300 0.274 -0.788*** 
 
(0.270) (0.316) (0.298) (0.278) (0.286) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** means significant at the 1 percent level, ** 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Rice Culture Theory of Cooperative Behavior: 




The globalization phenomenon from widespread trans-continental 
tourism (Chris Cooper and Salah Wahab, 2005) to migration patterns 
(Nikos Papastergiadis, 2013) in North America and Europe and some East 
Asian countries has heightened awareness of both the similarities and 
differences between people from different cultures. Indeed, while cultural 
differences are both fascinating and intriguing they also present 
challenges for international business negotiations to the conduct of foreign 
affairs by nations and importantly assimilation of migrants striving to adapt 
to new cultures. Indeed, cultural differences especially between East and 
West have been well documented (Theodore M. Singelis, 1994) and 
impact subtly and not so subtly on cognitive styles (S. Kitayama and A. K. 
Uskul, 2011), decision making (J. Henrich et al., 2005) and choice 
behaviors (U. Gneezy et al., 2009). Interestingly, the study of such cultural 
phenomenon have even spawned a new field so-called cultural 
neuroscience (Heejung S Kim and Joni Y Sasaki, 2014). Many studies in 
cultural psychology and cultural neuroscience have focused on cultural 	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differences between countries (Geert Hofstede et al., 1991, Keiko Ishii, 
2013) but such studies are unavoidably confounded by extraneous 
variables such as ethnicity, diverse law and governmental systems and 
many other such factors. Hence, there is some advantage to focus on 
cultural differences in the same country especially if certain differences 
resulting from ethnicity, genetic background and governmental systems 
are minimized. This strategy would potentially reduce noise and generate 
less ambiguous findings. 
We implement this strategy of examining the impact of cultural 
milieu within a single country using cooperative behavior in China and 
focusing in particular on difference in agricultural practices between rice 
paddy and wheat cultivation regions. Talhelm and his colleagues (T. 
Talhelm et al., 2014) hypothesized that rice farming encourages a culture 
of interdependency whereas wheat farming encourages greater 
independence among individuals. Moreover, these cultivation differences 
over historical time apparently become integrated into a region’s culture 
and gradually develop into cultural adaptations which presumably have a 
lasting effect on individual behavior even into the modern era. Such 
cultural adaptations become the Weltanschauung of such regions 
characterizing a somewhat permanent collective pattern of behavior no 
longer dependent on any individual’s experience with actual farming 
practices. We test elements of this rice culture theory by examining 
university students in Beijing representative of many Chinese provinces 
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and dip into the toolkit of experimental economics to examine cooperative 
behavior. We further use a national survey to examine real-life cooperative 
behavior in a large non-student based population.  
Rice along with wheat are among the most important food crops 
world wide and indeed rice ranks third in total food production (Papa 
Abdoulaye Seck et al., 2012). In China rice has a long history originating 
about 8200 years at the dawn of the world agricultural revolution (Xuehui 
Huang et al., 2012) and rice farming has become embedded in Chinese 
culture from the rice paddy to characterizing the national cuisine. The 
current study seeks to examine in depth the pervasive influence of rice 
cultivation on a distinguishing feature of human culture viz., cooperative 
behavior not based on kin relationships. A theoretical basis for a 
relationship between cooperation at the societal level and the rice paddy 
field is based on the evidence that cultivating rice requires much more 
labor input in comparison to other food crops such as corn or wheat. The 
irrigation needed for paddy rice is particularly demanding. Hsiao-Tung Fei 
(1939) originally observed that the irrigation system in the Yangtze River 
requires the cooperation of all the families in the village and families 
organized in turn to manually rotate the operation of the water wheels with 
the community-wide efforts.  
In the current study we put to the test elements of the rice culture 
theory as it applies to cooperative behavior examining in depth such 
behavior from several data sets. The first data set is generated in the 
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experimental economics tasks in a study by our group conducted in 2010 
and 2012 in Beijing with university students representative of various 
provinces in China. These incentivized laboratory tasks were carried out 
following the rubrics of experimental economics and we suggest provide 
robust measures of social preferences. Our second in depth data analysis 
relied on the 2010 wave of the China Family Panel Studies, which 
provides a national representative sample and employs broad field 
measures of social behavior. Notably, the overall evidence from both 
experimental and field sources supports the prediction of the rice culture 
theory that subjects born in rice paddy regions of China are characterized 
by more cooperative behavior in comparison to students born in non 
paddy regions. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the related 
literature; Section 2.3 shows the main empirical results; Section 2.4 
discusses the implications of the results; and Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature 
The evolution of cooperation among non-kin is an intriguing 
problem that is a continuing dilemma for evolutionary biologists, and social 
scientists including economists. Experimental economics seeks to model 
human choice behavior in the laboratory using incentivized and 
transparent behavioral tasks. In the realm of cooperation the public goods 
(PG) game has garnered particular attention for the representation of 
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group interactions. In the simplest version of a PG game, the one round 
version, participants anonymously decide how much of their endowment to 
contribute to the public kitty and the tokens in the public pot are generally 
multiplied by more than 1 and less than the total number of players in the 
game and the total pot is divided by the number of players (Ananish 
Chaudhuri, 2011). Each player also retains the amount he did not 
contribute to the public kitty.  The prediction of the Nash equilibrium in the 
one shot game is that people will contribute zero, while in lab experiments 
participants contribute between 40-60% of the optimal level although 
marked individual differences are observed from 0-100% of their 
endowment. Ananish Chaudhuri (2011) suggests that an important 
advance in our understanding of the psychology of participants in the PG 
game is the concept of “conditional cooperators whose contribution to the 
public good is positively correlated with their beliefs about the 
contributions to be made by their group members.”  
In the context of the current study viz., testing the rice theory as at 
least a partial explanation of human cooperation, we considered the one 
shot PG game as the most robust available experimental economic task 
that resonates with actual behavior in rice paddy cultivation where 
cooperation is crucial for the overall common good but some degree of 
free riding is always an alternative that participants may choose. Our 
overarching hypothesis is that participants characterized by an embedded 
rice culture norm would contribute more in a single shot PG game 
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compared to individuals born in a non-rice paddy geographical region. 
Hence, the one shot PG is the benchmark laboratory task in the current 
study. However, as discussed below experimental economists have 
devised a number of prosocial laboratory tasks that offer additional insight 
into the motivations underlying contributions to the PG game and the 
evolution of human cooperation according to the rice theory.  
 One model is altruism (James Andreoni, 1989, 1990) which 
assumes that people directly derive utility from their prosocial behavior. 
Another is the inequity aversion model, proposed by Ernst Fehr and Klaus 
M Schmidt (1999), which argues that the prosocial behavior in many 
experimental games could be explained by the motivation to achieve equal 
allocation between the subject and others. Yet, a third model (Martin 
Dufwenberg and Georg Kirchsteiger, 2004, Matthew Rabin, 1993) 
captures people’s reciprocity behavior using belief-based modeling. Gary 
Charness and Matthew Rabin (2002) added an efficiency motivation into 
consideration and showed that people often prefer a big pie in the in the 
prosocial context. All these models potentially deepen our understanding 
of individual differences in choice behavior exhibited in the PG game.  
A series of studies using modified dictator games (James Andreoni 
and John Miller, 2002, Raymond Fisman et al., 2014, Raymond Fisman et 
al., 2007) showed that people exhibit marked heterogeneity in social 
preferences. Moreover, prosocial field behavior also has been shown to 
vary across countries. For example, in April 1996, the Reader’s Digest 
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magazine (reported by the Economist, June 22, 1996) dropped 20 cash-
bearing wallets in each of 20 cities of western European countries and 10 
wallets in each of 12 US cities, and found that the frequency of returning 
wallets differed systematically. These cross-country field observations 
have subsequently been validated by Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer 
(1997) with survey data. 
Researchers use a variety of innovative designs to investigate the 
main determinants of preferences. Samuel Bowles (1998) argued that the 
markets and other economic institutions influence cultures and hence 
preferences. Joseph Henrich et al. (2001) used the index of market 
integration to explain the difference in people’s prosocial behavior across 
cultures. Nancy Qian (2008) employed a difference-in-differences method 
to investigate how the increase of tea price will reduce the gender ratio 
unbalance in south China. Using historical field data, Alberto Alesina et al. 
(2013) investigated how agricultural patterns influence people’s gender 
attitudes - societies that historically used the plough in agricultural 
production exhibit more unequal gender attitudes presumably since mainly 
men have the strength required for this type of cultivation. Using 
experimental economics tasks, Andreas Leibbrandt et al. (2013) compared 
competitiveness in traditional fishing societies, and found that fishermen 
from individualistic societies are far more competitive than fishermen from 
collective societies, and the this difference is positively correlated with 
work experience. Maria Bigoni et al. (2013) found that there are large 
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differences in cooperative behavior between the northern and southern 
regions of Italy, and suggested that the frequency of wars in history could 
explain these differences in norms. 
Although culture is one of the main determinants of people’s 
economic behaviors, cultural effects are notoriously difficult to 
quantitatively measure. Nevertheless, several studies show that culture 
influences experimental behavior modeled in the laboratory. Alvin E Roth 
et al. (1991) and Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin 
Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis and Richard McElreath (2001) found 
that behavior in the ultimatum game differs across cultures. Uri Gneezy et 
al. (2009) carried out seminal field experiments in African and Indian 
societies, and demonstrated that culture shapes people’s competitive 
behavior in experimental tasks. 
A new player in the field towards explaining the emergence of 
cooperative behavior in human society is the rice culture theory linking 
historical agricultural practices to cultural norms that become embedded in 
individual behavior. Malcolm Gladwell (2008) argued that the plantation of 
paddy rice might explain the wide difference in educational achievement 
between people from paddy rice areas and people from non-paddy rice 
areas. In their seminal study, T. Talhelm, X. Zhang, S. Oishi, C. Shimin, D. 
Duan, X. Lan and S. Kitayama (2014) provided the first quantitative 
evidence to support the notion that interdependent-independent cognitive 
styles are to some extent dependent on historical rice paddy farming. 
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While Jianqing Ruan et al. (2014) raised some doubts on Talhelm et al. 
(2014)’s paper. Our study departs from previous approaches by 
introducing laboratory based experimental economic tasks as well as by 
examining participants in a national representative sample in China to test 
whether subjects born in rice paddy regions of China are indeed 
characterized by greater prosocial norms.  
Another relevant concept is that of social capital. Robert Putnam 
(1993) defined it as “features of social organization such as trust, norms 
and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated actions”. Social capital is one of the key concepts in social 
sciences, and is measured at both the individual (Edward L Glaeser et al., 
2002, Dean S Karlan, 2005) and community levels (James Coleman, S, 
1990, Robert D Putnam, 2000). Edward L Glaeser, David Laibson and 
Bruce Sacerdote (2002) advocated the application of methodology derived 
from experimental economics to measure social capital and found that 
subjects’ past trust behavior predicts people’s behavior in the trust game. 
Dean S Karlan (2005) showed that people’s behavior in the trust game 
predicts people’s default rate at the level of microcredit economic 
interactions. The current study is related with social capital at the 
individual level, since we use experimental games as the main measure 
for each individual’s prosocial behavior. Our research will contribute to a 
more complete picture of the differences in social capital across regions in 
China. 
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2.3 Results  
2.3.1 Empirical strategy 
To investigate the relationship between the rice farming ratio and 
people’s cooperative behavior, we use both ordinary regression and 
instrumental variable regression. The following equation is our baseline 
specification,  
Ci,p = a + βRicep+ λXi,p + ηWp + εi,p , 
 
where Ci,p is the measurement of cooperation, Ricep is the proportion of 
rice farming at the province level, Xi,p is the individual control variables 
including gender and family income, Wp is the province level control 
variables such as GPD per capita in 2010. 
The instrumental variable regression tries to solve the possible 
endogeneity problem such as measurement error and reverse causality. 
The rice theory uses the rice cultivation data in 1996, the oldest available 
data from China Statistical Yearbook, as a measure of agricultural 
differences across China. This is not the perfect measure of historical rice 
farming ratio that influences the local culture, and measurement error may 
occur. 
Based on the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s Global 
Agro-ecological Zones database, T. Talhelm, X. Zhang, S. Oishi, C. Shimin, D. 
Duan, X. Lan and S. Kitayama (2014) chose a score called rice suitability as the 
instrument for the rice farming. It is a score of the environmental suitability for 
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growing wetland rice. The United Nations uses multiple dimensions of geographic 
information from temperature, humidity, evaporation, soil quality, and slope to 
compute the score. Our later results will show that it is not a weak instrument. 
Many researchers (Alberto Alesina, Nathan Nunn and Paola Giuliano, 2013, 
Francesco Amodio and Giorgio Chiovelli, 2013, Oeindrila Dube et al., 2013, 
Jacob Hochard and Edward Barbier, 2014) have used this database to run 
instrumental variable regressions to handle the possible endogeneity problem 
associated with the agricultural production. 
Some people worry that these environmental conditions may not impact 
people’s cooperative behavior through the production of rice. For example, low 
temperature may prompt people to stay more in their own houses and have less 
social interaction. Our subsequent results show that some regions with high 
temperature will have less social interaction. 
With additional consideration of the prior results on independent and 
interdependent thinking style, the direction of our results using several data sets 
is consistent with each other. It is difficult to rationalize all the results only using 
information of temperature rather than the rice culture theory. 
2.3.2 Evidence from Incentivized Experimental Games 
(I) Experimental Tasks 
In 2010 and 2012, we ran two waves of experimental studies in 
Beijing. With a total of 1043 university student subjects from different 
provinces of China, we study people’s prosocial behavior with one-short 
experimental tasks including public goods game, trust game, modified 
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dictator game, and some other games. All the tasks are incentivized – we 
randomly choose one of these social games to implement it, and pay the 
cash according to their decisions5. These measures are based on the real 
behavior of the subjects, and they are better instrument compared with the 
simple questionnaire especially in the prosocial area. In addition, we 
collected demographic information through questionnaires including their 
birthplace. The Appendix A shows the experimental instructions. 
Our approach has several advantages on studying this problem. 
Firstly, for cooperative behavior, we collected the behavioral data, rather 
than self-report or non-incentivized tasks. Secondly, although students 
from different provinces may have different cultural backgrounds, they are 
in the same environment – Beijing; this makes our test environment less 
noisy. Thirdly, the rich experimental games enable us to dig deep into true 
motivation under different prosocial situations. 
The following games are directly related with cooperative behavior. 
The public goods game (PG) is widely used in the experimental 
economics. In our study, each subject participates in a public goods game 
with another anonymous players. For the endowment of RMB 80 Yuan, 
the subject allocates it between a common pool and his own pocket. The 
return rate of the common pool is 1.6. After the two players make their 
decisions, the amount in the pool will be distributed equally to both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Although we didn’t randomize the order of experimental tasks, we don’t think it will 
cause serious measurement error. The first reason is that our subjects received no 
feedback on their decisions in each task; the second is that the average behavior in our 
games is generally consistent with those in the existing literature.	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players. If there is no other-regarding preference, the optimal strategy for 
the subject is to invest nothing in the common pool. While if people take 
cooperative behavior and put money in the common pool, the money 
contributed is used as a measure of cooperation. 
One famous experimental task measuring trust behavior is the 
trust game (TG). In the experiment, Person A is endowed with 80 Yuan, 
and makes the decision to send some amount of money to Person B. The 
money sent to Person B will be tripled; in turn Person B will decide the 
amount of money sent back to Person A. Usually researchers use the 
amount that Person A send out as a measure of trust behavior, while use 
the amount that Person B send back as a measure of trustworthiness. In 
our study, we adopt the strategy method to get people’s decision as both 
Person A and Person B6. 
We also employed the modified dictator game developed by 
James Andreoni and John Miller (2002). This game contains 5 dictator 
games, and varies the endowments and the relative prices of giving from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This approach may bias upward the amount of trust and trustworthiness seen in the 
experiment. In our sample, the average trusting amount is around 60% of the endowment 
and the return rate is 115%, which are within the usual range of 40%-60% trusting and 
110% average repayments in the literature. In addition, our research focus is how the rice 
farming ratio influence the additional amount of trusting, hence the level of trusting is not 
important. The Appendix A shows the original instructions. 
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1/3 to 3. This game provides useful information on people’s altruistic 
preferences under different situations. 
Results 
Figure 2.1 depicts a map of the People’s Republic of China, and 
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of subjects in each province covered in 
our sample. All the provinces except Tibet are covered in our sample. The 
subjects are distributed relatively equally across the whole China, and 
there is no single province that contributes more than 10% of the total 
sample. To be consistent with the analysis of T. Talhelm, X. Zhang, S. 
Oishi, C. Shimin, D. Duan, X. Lan and S. Kitayama (2014),we also 
excluded the subjects from Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, considering their 
large group of non-Han ethnic peoples and a strong herding culture. 
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Figure 2.1 Map of the People’s Republic of China 
 
Notes: The central shadow area is the People’s Republic of China, with each province 
being separated by lines. 
 
Table 2.1 Sample Distribution across Provinces 
Province N Percent Province N Percent 
      Anhui 37 3.46 Jiangsu 37 3.46 
Beijing 31 2.9 Jiangxi 69 6.45 
Chongqing 11 1.03 Jilin 41 3.84 
Fujian 33 3.09 Liaoning 6 0.56 
Gansu 37 3.46 Ningxia 19 1.78 
Guangdong 27 2.53 Qinghai 6 0.56 
Guangxi 22 2.06 Shaanxi 49 4.58 
Guizhou 15 1.4 Shandong 101 9.45 
Hainan 10 0.94 Shanghai 7 0.65 
Hebei 67 6.27 Shanxi 50 4.68 
Heilongjiang 45 4.21 Sichuan 53 4.96 
Henan 99 9.26 Tianjin 23 2.15 
Hubei 43 4.02 Xinjiang 21 1.96 
Hunan 38 3.55 Yunnan 22 2.06 
Inner Mongolia 20 1.87 Zhejiang 30 2.81 
 
Table 2.2 provides the descriptive statistics of the main variables. 
Notice that the average contribution in the public goods game is around 50 
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Yuan, which is more than half of the endowment 80 Yuan. This pattern is a 
clear rejection of the prediction of Nash equilibrium with pure selfish 
motivation. Table 2.3 shows the average public goods contributions of 
each province in the ascending order - there is a lot of heterogeneity 
across provinces. 




error Min Max Observations 
      
Contribution in PG 49.7174 26.7462 0 80 1043 
Sex .5064 .5002 0 1 1041 
Income 6.0246 6.3220 0 72  986 
Percent of paddy .3144 .3157 0 .88 1022 
Rice suitability index 26.6905 23.8468 0 56.2 1022 
GDP 2010 3.1832 1.4254 1.3119 7.6074 1022 
Notes: Sex is a dummy variable for which 1 means female and 0 means male. Income 
and GDP 2010 numbers are reported in units of 10,000 RMB. 
 
Table 2.3 Average Contributions in the Public Goods Game 
 
Province N Contribution Province N Contribution 
      Shanghai 7 32.8572 Chongqing 11 51.3636 
Heilongjiang 45 34.3333 Beijing 31 51.9032 
Gansu 37 39.1792 Shanxi 50 52.3876 
Jilin 41 41.5 Ningxia 19 52.6316 
Fujian 33 43.394 Anhui 37 53.054 
Tianjin 23 44.1304 Guangxi 22 53.7272 
Hebei 67 46.0448 Qinghai 6 54.5 
Jiangsu 37 47.5948 Jiangxi 69 54.7392 
Liaoning 6 47.6668 Hunan 38 54.8684 
Guizhou 15 48.4668 Zhejiang 30 55 
Guangdong 27 48.5184 Shaanxi 49 56.9148 
Sichuan 53 49.9624 Hubei 43 56.9308 
Henan 99 50.6272 Yunnan 22 59.8636 
Shandong 101 51.1088 Hainan 10 60 
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Public Goods Game 
 
Table 2.4 shows the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) and 
instrumental regression (IV) results of the public goods game. In OLS 
regressions, the contribution amount in the public goods game is positively 
correlated with the percent of paddy rice farming area relative to the total 
plantation area in the province, with or without control variables including 
gender, family income, province GDP per capita in 2010, and the study 
wave dummy variable etc.; the coefficient is around 5, which means that if 
subject is born in a province which has 100% paddy rice will contribute 5 
Yuan more than those who is born in a province with no paddy rice 
farming. In the instrumental regressions, the paddy rice ratio becomes 
significant at the 0.05 statistical level; the coefficients increase to around 
10, which suggests a bigger impact of rice culture. In addition, we notice 
that the male subjects tend to contribute more than the female subjects. 
For the family income and province level GDP per capita, both of them are 
negative; this suggests that in our student sample, higher income level 
tends to let them contribute less in the public goods game. Appendix A 
shows the original instructions. Appendix B shows the first-stage results of 
the instrumental regression. 
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Table 2.4 OLS and IV Estimates of The Public Goods Game 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
     VARIABLES Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution 
          
Percent of 
paddy 
4.983 5.517* 10.60** 10.10** 





































Constant 48.34*** 52.23*** 46.57*** 50.82*** 
 
(1.791) (3.331) (2.232) (3.739) 
    




R-squared 0.003 0.012   0.009 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level7. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sex is a dummy variable for which 1 
means female and 0 means male. Income and GDP 2010 numbers are reported in units 
of 10,000 RMB. Wave 2010 is a dummy variable for which 1 means the 2010 study and 0 




Trust is another behavior closely related with cooperation. The 
results from the trust game in Table 2.5 are similar with those in the public 
goods game. In OLS regression, the rice ratio in each province is 
positively correlated with the trust behavior. In instrumental variable 
regressions, the ratio becomes statistically significant at 5% level. The 
magnitude of rice ratio is similar. There is a noticeable gender effect: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  We also checked the bootstrapping standard error at the province level, and all the 
results remain robust.	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males tend to trust more. However, for the trustworthiness behavior of the 
trustee, we have not found that the rice ratio has an effect8. 
Table 2.5 The Trust Game 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS OLS IV IV 
     VARIABLES Trust in TG Trust in TG Trust in TG Trust in TG 
          
Percent of 
paddy 
3.549 3.822* 8.241* 6.754** 





































Constant 47.24*** 53.09*** 45.77*** 52.19*** 
 
(1.458) (2.430) (1.882) (2.541) 
     Observations 1,020 962 1,020 962 
F-stat 
  
1458.28    407.64 
R-squared 0.002 0.053   0.052 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sex is a dummy variable for which 1 
means female and 0 means male. Income and GDP 2010 numbers are reported in units 
of 10,000 RMB. Wave 2010 is a dummy variable for which 1 means the 2010 study and 0 
means the 2012 study. F-stat is the F statistic of the first stage result in the instrumental 
regression. 
 
People’s contribution in the public goods game and the trust 
behavior in the trust game are not due to solely social preference, and risk 
may play a role if people have reciprocity motivation. In order to determine 
whether risk attitude rather than social preference is the driving force of 
our previous results, we add a risk attitude measure. The risk attitude 
measure is the subject’s switching point in his choice between a lottery 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 We use the slope and intercept of the regression from trustee’s return amount on his 
received amount as the measure of trustworthiness, and this measure is not significantly 
correlated with the rice farming ratio. The Appendix C shows the results. 
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and some certain amount of money. Appendix A shows the instructions for 
this task. Table 2.6 shows that our main results still hold: a higher paddy 
rice farming ratio signifies that people are more prosocial in the two 
games, and the magnitude is similar to those in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. 
The risk measure is statistically significant at the 0.1 level in the trust 
game, but not significant in the public goods game. The coefficients are all 
positive in both games: if people are more risk taking, they tend to 
cooperate more or trust more. It suggests that, although risk attitude plays 
a role in people’s cooperative behavior, it is not the driving force. 
Table 2.6 Controlling for Risk Attitude 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS OLS IV IV 
    
VARIABLES 
Contribution 
in PG Trust in TG 
Contribution 
in PG Trust in TG 
          
Percent of 
paddy 
5.331 3.032 10.51** 5.559 
(3.375) (2.124) (5.139) (3.627) 
Risk 0.354 1.036* 0.282 1.001* 
 
(0.461) (0.528) (0.456) (0.535) 
Sex -3.143* -8.768*** -3.177** -8.782*** 
 
(1.684) (1.579) (1.607) (1.527) 
Income -0.268 -0.107 -0.281* -0.113 
 
(0.168) (0.121) (0.164) (0.117) 
GDP 2010 -0.344 -0.900* -0.329 -0.894* 
 
(0.678) (0.454) (0.737) (0.482) 
Wave 2010 -1.578 3.309** -1.500 3.348** 
 
(1.889) (1.585) (1.890) (1.561) 
Constant 50.93*** 49.01*** 49.69*** 48.40*** 
 
(4.688) (3.804) (4.922) (3.810) 
     Observations 851 848 851 848 
F-stat 
  
304.37    299.54 
R-squared 0.013 0.063 0.010 0.062 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sex is a dummy variable for which 1 
means female and 0 means male. Income and GDP 2010 numbers are reported in units 
of 10,000 RMB. Wave 2010 is a dummy variable for which 1 means the 2010 study and 0 
means the 2012 study. Risk is a measure of risk attitude in an experimental lottery choice 
task ranging from 0 to 10; a higher the number means the subject is more risk loving. F-
stat is the F statistic of the first stage result in the instrumental regression. 
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Modified Dictator Game 
Is rice farming’s influence on cooperative behavior mainly driven 
by altruism? The results in our modified dictator game suggest it is not the 
case.  The design of the modified dictator game comes from Andreoni and 
Miller (2002). Appendix A shows the detailed instructions. All the 
dependent variables in Table 2.7 are the amount of money sent out by the 
subjects in the dictator game. Equations (1) to (5) corresponds to the five 
efficiency ratios of the money sent out to the other party. For example, in 
Equation (1) of Table 2.7, the efficiency ratio is 2, and it means that if the 
subject sends out 1 dollar, the other subject will receive 2 dollar. For 
Equations (1) and (2), the coefficients of rice farming ratio are both 
positive but statistically insignificant; this direction is consistent with those 
in the PG and TG. For Equations (3) to (5), the coefficients of rice farming 
ratio become even negative. Notice that when the efficiency ratio becomes 
1/2 or 1/3, the action of altruism is inefficient. Overall the results here 
suggest that people come from provinces with a higher rice farming ratio 
tend to be less altruistic in the inefficient occasions. We could understand 
this result with another perspective – in these inefficient cases, higher rice 
farming ratio tend to let people choose the actions that maximize the sum 
of the two players, since keep the money in your own hand is efficient. 
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Table 2.7 IV Estimates of the Modified Dictator Game 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
R=2 R=3 R=1/2 R=1/3 R=1 
VARIABLES Giving Giving Giving Giving Giving 
            
Percent of 
paddy 
3.480 4.259 -9.865** -20.35** -1.255 
(6.083) (3.609) (4.920) (8.167) (2.466) 
Sex -11.97*** -6.643*** 6.698** 8.872 -0.340 
 
(2.146) (1.329) (3.365) (5.773) (2.067) 
Wave 2010 8.643*** 5.651*** -2.553 -0.655 -0.874 
 
(3.212) (2.148) (2.125) (3.563) (2.123) 
Income -0.454* -0.194 -0.257 -0.576 -0.345** 
 
(0.245) (0.174) (0.218) (0.351) (0.143) 
GDP 2010 -0.469 -0.691 -1.461 -0.445 -0.218 
 
(1.098) (0.571) (1.050) (1.947) (0.327) 
Constant 66.96*** 35.03*** 48.91*** 69.39*** 40.58*** 
 
(3.310) (1.941) (3.761) (6.164) (2.130) 
      Observations 967 966 966 968 969 
F-stat 411.86 411.68 408.15 412.39 413.99 
R-squared 0.040 0.041 0.015 0.010 0.008 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sex is a dummy variable for which 1 
means female and 0 means male. Income and GDP 2010 numbers are reported in units 
of 10,000 RMB. Wave 2010 is a dummy variable for which 1 means the 2010 study and 0 
means the 2012 study. All the coefficients come from instrument variable regressions. F-
stat is the F statistic of the first stage result in the instrumental regression. 
 
Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
Is rice farming’s influence on cooperative behavior mainly driven 
by the inequality aversion motivation? The results in a sequential game 
suggest it is not the case. Figure 2.2 illustrates the sequential game: 
Person A moves first with the choice of Left or Right, then Person B 
chooses Left or Right with the knowledge of Person A’s action, which 
leads to the final outcomes. Notice that when Person A chooses Left, 
Person B’s action of choosing Left will lead to the outcome of ($120, $120) 
– it is both efficient and equal compared with the alternative choice Right; 
when Person A chooses Right, Person B’s action of choosing Left will lead 
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to outcome ($140, $60) – it is efficient but not equal compared with the 
Right choice. Although we use the strategy method, intention may matters 
here. Maybe Person B think Person A’s choice of Left means good 
intention, hence tends to choose Left to reward Person A; similarly Person 
B may think Person A’s choice of Right means bad intention, hence tends 
to choose Right to punish Person A. For Person B’s choice, the directions 
of positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity options are the same as the 
more efficient ones.  
Outlined in Table 2.8 are the results on the linear probability 
regression on Player B’s choice, should Player A chooses Left. In the four 
regressions, the general message is that a higher ratio of rice farming 
translates into a higher probability that people will prefer the ($120, $120) 
outcome to the ($60, $140) one. This result is consistent with people’s 
behavior in the public goods game and the trust game. Outlined in Table 
2.9 are the results on the linear probability regression on Player B’s choice, 
should Player A chooses Right. Here a higher ratio of rice farming 
translates into a higher probability that people will prefer ($140, $60) 
outcome to ($68, $68) one. This result is in the same direction as people’s 
behavior in the inefficient dictator game. In other words, people from 
higher rice farming ratio areas seem to be more averse to inequality or 
more positive reciprocal in the efficiency-enhancing situations, but not in 
the inefficient case. 
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Figure 2.2 The Sequential Game 
 
 
Table 2.8 Person B’s Choice of Left in the Sequential Game 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
     VARIABLES Left Choice Left Choice Left Choice Left Choice 
          
Percent of 
paddy 
0.0714 0.0903 0.149* 0.150** 





































Constant 0.595*** 0.665*** 0.571*** 0.647*** 
 
(0.0196) (0.0445) (0.0235) (0.0449) 




R-squared 0.002 0.015   0.013 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable Left Choice is a 
dummy variable for which 0 means Right and 1 means Left. Sex is a dummy variable for 
which 1 means female and 0 means male. Income and GDP 2010 numbers are reported 
in units of 10,000 RMB. Wave 2010 is a dummy variable for which 1 means the 2010 
study and 0 means the 2012 study. F-stat is the F statistic of the first stage result in the 
instrumental regression. 
 
	   68	  
Table 2.9 Person B’s Choice of Right in the Sequential Game 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS OLS IV IV 










          
Percent of 
paddy 
0.157*** 0.135*** 0.218*** 0.148*** 





































Constant 0.339*** 0.436*** 0.320*** 0.431*** 
 
(0.0215) (0.0430) (0.0284) (0.0479) 
     Observations 1,018 961 1,018 961 
F-stat 
  
1451.46        409.90 
R-squared 0.010 0.015 0.009 0.015 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable Right Choice is a 
dummy variable for which 0 means Right and 1 means Left. Sex is a dummy variable for 
which 1 means female and 0 means male. Income and GDP 2010 numbers are reported 
in units of 10,000 RMB. Wave 2010 is a dummy variable for which 1 means the 2010 
study and 0 means the 2012 study. F-stat is the F statistic of the first stage result in the 
instrumental regression. 
 
Overall we find strong support for the rice theory on people’s 
cooperative behavior in the public goods game. Additional results from the 
trust game, the risk task, the modified dictator game, and the sequential 
game help us narrow down the possible explanations on how the rice 
farming ratio influences people’s cooperative behavior – risk taking, 
altruism, and inequality aversion may not be the driving forces. These 
results suggest that efficiency motivation is the key, and reciprocity 
motivation may also plays a role. 
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2.3.3 Evidence from China Family Panel Studies Data 
There are several concerns in our above empirical results. The first 
is that the subjects are all college students, and they may have different 
behavior from ordinary people. Another concern that our sample is not a 
representative sample of the entire China, and it is difficult to generalize 
the conclusions to the national level. The third is that this data only provide 
a preference-based measure of cooperative behavior, and more broad 
measures are necessary to understand the robustness of the preference-
based measurement. 
The China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) is a large national 
representative panel survey data in China. It collects individual, family, and 
community level data in 25 provinces, and has broad information on 
China’s society, economy, demography, education, and health etc. The 
CFPS 2010 wave is its first wave data, and there are more than 50,000 
individual observations. We use both individual and community level data 
to study how rice culture influence people’s cooperative behavior. For 
better comparison with previous results from experimental games, all the 
measures used are based on people’s behavior rather than attitudes. 
Our previous results show that the cooperative behavior in the 
public goods game may be due to reciprocity motivation. The following two 
questions in CFPS provide measurement on reciprocity: “Have you ever 
received help from others?” and “Have you ever provided help to others?” 
Column (1) and Column (2) in Table 2.10 are both OLS estimation results, 
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and we find that the coefficients of paddy rice ratio are positive but not 
statistically significant. With regard to the instrumental regressions of 
Column (3) to Column (4), the coefficients of paddy rice ratio suggest a 
large effect: when the paddy rice ratio increases by 1 percent, the 
probability of get help or give help will increase by around 0.1 percent; 
both of them are significant at 5% level. 
Table 2.10 Get and Give Help 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
     VARIABLES Get help Give help Get help Give help 
          
Percent of 
paddy 
0.0573 0.0609 0.109** 0.0978** 
(0.0491) (0.0512) (0.0502) (0.0456) 
Sex 
 
-0.0781*** -0.0711*** -0.0783*** -0.0713*** 
(0.00861) (0.00832) (0.00826) (0.00780) 
Personal 
income 
0.00653* 0.0343*** 0.00599** 0.0339*** 
(0.00321) (0.00507) (0.00243) (0.00478) 
Family 
income 
0.0000595 0.00222** -0.0000656 0.00213** 
(0.000757) (0.000957) (0.000737) (0.000955) 
Expenditure 0.00138* 0.000710 0.00135* 0.000689 
 
(0.000726) (0.000768) (0.000704) (0.000795) 
Urban -0.0320 -0.0106 -0.0329 -0.0112 
 
(0.0236) (0.0176) (0.0232) (0.0199) 
GDP 2010 -0.0247* -0.0142 -0.0271*** -0.0159** 
 
(0.0129) (0.0108) (0.00854) (0.00781) 
Constant 0.546*** 0.327*** 0.539*** 0.321*** 
 
(0.0461) (0.0400) (0.0365) (0.0337) 




R-squared 0.014 0.038 0.013 0.037 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sex is a dummy variable for which 1 
means female and 0 means male. Personal income, Family income, Expenditure, GDP 
2010 numbers are reported in units of 10,000 RMB. Urban is dummy variable in which 1 
means urban Hukou status and 0 means rural Hukou status. Family member 1 means the 
number of core family members, and Family member 2 means the number of other family 
members. Here we only use the Han Chinese sample, and the unit of observation is 
individual. F-stat is the F statistic of the first stage result in the instrumental regression. 
 
In daily life, cooperative behavior involves social interaction, the 
behavioral measure of which is encapsulated in the following two 
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questions on frequency: “Last month, do you have any social interactions 
with your neighbors?” and “Last month, do you have any social 
interactions with your relatives?” Table 2.11 indicates the results of linear 
probability estimation of social interaction. The dependent variables are 
dummy variables on whether the person has any social interaction with the 
neighbors or relatives. Column (1) and (2) are OLS estimation, and we 
noticed that the paddy rice planation ratio has a moderate and statistical 
significant effect on social interaction: 1 percent increase of rice farming 
ratio will increase the probability of interacting with the neighbor by around 
0.1 percent. Column (3) and (4) illustrate that this pattern still holds when 
we use rice suitability index as the instrument for paddy rice farming. 
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Table 2.11 Social Interaction 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS IV IV 










          
Percent of 
paddy 
0.105** 0.0884** 0.103** 0.117** 
(0.0391) (0.0370) (0.0430) (0.0479) 
Family income 0.000984 0.00266 0.000989 0.00262 
 
(0.000648) (0.00179) (0.000639) (0.00173) 
Expenditure 0.000467** 0.00124** 0.000468** 0.00123** 
 
(0.000218) (0.000578) (0.000212) (0.000565) 
Urban -0.0457 0.103*** -0.0457 0.103*** 
 
(0.0328) (0.0248) (0.0320) (0.0244) 
GDP 2010 0.00528 0.0117 0.00533 0.0109 
 



















Constant 0.702*** 0.480*** 0.703*** 0.476*** 
 
(0.0581) (0.0553) (0.0559) (0.0545) 
     Observations 13,555 13,550 13,555 13,550 
F-stat 
  
           30.95        22.34 
R-squared 0.009 0.029 0.009 0.029 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Family income, Expenditure, and GDP 
2010 numbers are reported in units of 10,000 RMB. Urban is a dummy variable for which 
1 means urban Hukou status and 0 means rural Hukou status. Core family member 
means the number of core family members, and Other family member means the number 
of other family members. Here we only use the Han Chinese sample, and the unit of 
observation is family. F-stat is the F statistic of the first stage result in the instrumental 
regression. 
 
The China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) also provides community 
level data, which enable us to determine whether the rice culture 
influences public goods provision at the community level. In the 
questionnaire, one question inquires into the allocation of resources by a 
village in the preceding year. There are 7 categories: (1) village 
administration fee, (2) the money distributed to the villagers, (3) the money 
on public services (road, water, electricity etc.), (4) the money on 
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education, (5) the investment on production (agriculture, irrigation etc.), (5) 
the investment on the collective enterprises, (6) the investment on the 
collective enterprises, and (7) other expenditures except the above ones. 
The third category is directly related to the provision of public goods. In 
China, at the village level, most of the communities could select their 
village committee through direct voting. Accordingly, these decisions on 
village expenditure may reflect ordinary people’s willingness. We checked 
whether the rice culture would have an impact on the provision of 
community public goods. 
The estimation results in Table 2.12 lend some support to our 
previous finding using the college student sample. From Column (3), the 
coefficient of paddy rice ratio is 557.9 and marginal significant (p value is 
0.065), which implies that 1 percent of rice ratio increase will lead to 55.79 
thousand RMB more spending in public service. Notice that we don’t find 
statistically significant impact on other categories of expenditure. Since 
public service expenditure is a measure of public goods, we take the 
results as support of the rice theory. 
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Table 2.12 Village Expenditure 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        VARIABLES Admin Distribution Service Education Production Economy Others 
                
Percent of 
paddy 
312.2 -21.33 557.9* 317.5 90.49 255.8 255.8 
(234.0) (29.61) (302.0) (202.3) (163.3) (184.1) (184.1) 
Financial 
income 
1,178*** 12.23*** 1,115*** 529.0*** 65.51 121.5 121.5 
(394.3) (4.531) (400.5) (192.3) (49.30) (114.5) (114.5) 
Population -0.00672 0.0170** -0.0129 -0.0129 -0.00316 0.00523 0.00523 
 
(0.0124) (0.00854) (0.0191) (0.0169) (0.00991) (0.0113) (0.0113) 
Income per 
capita 
-222.5** 69.50*** -264.4** -121.3 8.043 -93.45 -93.45 
(106.1) (24.27) (110.6) (98.73) (74.09) (95.57) (95.57) 
Urban -117.2 7.185 -123.2* -51.92 12.82 -98.96* -98.96* 
 
(117.2) (7.525) (63.19) (77.92) (128.5) (53.51) (53.51) 
Constant 200.4*** -42.00** 101.1** 53.75 53.12 32.09 32.09 
 
(53.01) (16.98) (48.75) (45.55) (35.40) (29.78) (29.78) 
        Observations 322 332 330 330 330 332 332 
F-stat 35.22 34.03 32.39 32.55 32.37 34.67 34.67 
R-squared 0.159 0.196 0.251 0.120 0.002 0.025 0.025 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Financial income and Income per capita 
numbers are reported in units of 10,000 RMB.  Urban is a dummy variable for which 1 
means urban Hukou status and 0 means rural Hukou status. Here we use only the Han 




If rice culture influences public goods provision in local 
communities, it may also influence the economic growth rate. As a rough 
test, we use the ratio of province level GPD per capita of 2010 over GDP 
capita of 1978 as a measurement of economic growth rate, and check its 
relationship with the ratio of rice farming in each province. Figure 2.3 
shows that the economic growth rate is positively correlated with rice 
farming ratio. Table 2.13 demonstrates more results using both regression 
and instrumental variable regression. The direction is consistent with the 
rice culture theory – high rice farming tends to let the local people have 
higher social capital, hence higher economic growth rate. This rules out 
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one alternative hypothesis - the economic growth will reduce the 
proportion of agricultural land area and especially the main crop’s farming 
area, which means that higher economic growth rate will leads to lower 
rice farming ratio. 





Table 2.13 Economic Growth and Rice Farming 
 
  (1) (2) 
 OLS IV 
   VARIABLES Growth rate Growth rate 





GDP 1978 -0.0328*** -0.0330*** 
 
(0.00587) (0.00582) 
Constant 86.37*** 85.41*** 
 
(7.492) (7.436) 




R-squared 0.405 0.405 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
GDP 1978 per capita numbers are reported in units of RMB. Here we use the province 
level data. F-stat is the F statistic of the first stage result in the instrumental regression. 




When we put everything together, the overall evidence suggests 
that the rice culture will make people more cooperative. The experimental 
games provide incentivized measures of cooperative behavior, while the 
students sample is relative homogeneous. These give us good internal 
validity. The CFPS data has a national representative sample as well as 
more broad measure of prosocial behavior, which adds external validity to 
the previous results.  
However, apart from the rice theory, there are several alternative 
hypotheses. 
Alternative Hypothesis 1: modernization hypothesis. Joseph 
Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, 
Herbert Gintis and Richard McElreath (2001) pointed out the prosocial 
behavior in the 15 cultures across world is negatively correlated with the 
market integration index. This suggests that, in the modernization process 
people may become more self-interested over time. 
To test this hypothesis, alternative measures of modernization 
have to be studied. One straightforward measure of modernization is GDP 
per capita. Since in our above regressions we have controlled for the GDP 
per capita, this is not the driving force of our rice culture theory results. In 
addition, we check three other measures of modernization to the control 
variables (T. Talhelm, X. Zhang, S. Oishi, C. Shimin, D. Duan, X. Lan and 
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S. Kitayama, 2014).The first one is the percentage of Internet penetration 
per province in 2007 from the China Internet Network Information Center, 
since some think that it is an indicator of the extent to which modern 
technology influences people’s life. The second measure is the 
percentage of labor force employed in the private industry in 1996, since 
many think that China’s modernization process is a transition from a state-
owned or collective-owned economy to a private economy. The third 
measure is the percentage of GDP in industry and service in 2010, since 
modernization level is closely associated with industrialization process. 
The results as outlined in Table 2.14, however, show that no measure is 
an effective predictor of cooperative behavior in the OLS regression. 
Table 2.14 Modernization Hypothesis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














              
Internet 








 Private firm 
employment   
-40.79 51.84  
 
  
(103.9) (50.38)  
 Industry ratio 
 
  0.0332 0.0749 
    (0.330) (0.202) 
Sex -3.083* -8.999*** -2.970* -9.048*** -3.533** -9.033*** 
 
(1.593) (1.561) (1.585) (1.590) (1.595) (1.520) 
Income -0.274* -0.150 -0.272* -0.134 -0.288* -0.148 
 
(0.160) (0.113) (0.158) (0.111) (0.157) (0.110) 
GDP 2010 -0.457 -0.716 -0.0479 -0.920** -0.337 -1.059 
 
(0.809) (0.905) (0.612) (0.431) (0.939) (0.629) 
Wave 2010 -0.597 3.758*** -0.742 3.736** -1.034 3.529** 
 
(1.630) (1.354) (1.647) (1.357) (1.617) (1.325) 
Constant 54.01*** 54.27*** 54.04*** 53.98*** 51.25* 48.18*** 
 
(3.059) (2.345) (3.197) (2.265) (27.17) (16.84) 
    
  
 Observations 965 962 956 953 965 962 
R-squared 0.008 0.051 0.008 0.050 0.008 0.051 
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Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sex is a dummy variable for which 1 
means female and 0 means male. Income and GDP 2010 numbers are reported in units 
of 10,000 RMB. Wave 2010 is a dummy variable for which 1 means the 2010 study and 0 
means the 2012 study. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis 2: the pathogen prevalence theory. Some 
studies (Corey L Fincher et al., 2008) point out that local culture could be 
influenced by the prevalence of infectious diseases – more infectious 
diseases will make people more suspicious of strangers, and hence more 
interdependent in local community. We test this hypothesis using the 
same data set of T. Talhelm, X. Zhang, S. Oishi, C. Shimin, D. Duan, X. 
Lan and S. Kitayama (2014). The following Table 2.15 shows the 
estimation results of pathogen prevalence theory where we only replace 
the rice farming variable with the death rate of infectious diseases. Since 
the infectious disease variables in all the equations are highly insignificant, 
we could easily reject this hypothesis. The general pattern of pathogen 
distribution in China confirms the above results: the southwest part of 
China has the highest proportion, while our prosocial behavior has the 
highest proportion at the south and central provinces. 
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Table 2.15 Death Rate of Infectious Diseases 
 
  (1) (2) 
 
 
 VARIABLES Contribution in PG Trust in TG 
      




Sex -4.089** -9.146*** 
 
(1.611) (1.765) 
Income -0.444*** -0.282*** 
 
(0.132) (0.0867) 
GDP 2010 0.167 -0.632 
 
(0.991) (0.547) 
Wave 2010 -0.0352 4.445** 
 
(1.918) (1.623) 





 Observations 766 764 
R-squared 0.021 0.067 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Death rate of infectious diseases is a z 
score compile by T. Talhelm, X. Zhang, S. Oishi, C. Shimin, D. Duan, X. Lan and S. 
Kitayama (2014) which contains 21 provinces; the original data sets come from census 
data and a survey study (Junshi Chen et al., 1990). Sex is a dummy variable for which 1 
means female and 0 means male. Income and GDP 2010 numbers are reported in units 
of 10,000 RMB. Wave 2010 is a dummy variable for which 1 means the 2010 study and 0 
means the 2012 study. 
 
 
Alternative Hypothesis 3: political control. Some think that if the 
region is closer to the political center Beijing, the government will have 
tighter ideology control, which will promote people’s cooperative behavior 
through socialism education. To test this hypothesis, we use the distance 
between Beijing and the capital of the province as the proxy for the 
ideological control. The OLS regression results in Table 2.16 show that 
there is no effect of the distance to Beijing. 
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Table 2.16 Distance to Beijing 
 
  (1) (2) 
 
 
 VARIABLES Contribution in PG Trust in TG 
      
Beijing distance 0.00108 0.000169 
 
(0.00134) (0.00113) 
Sex -3.560** -9.040*** 
 
(1.590) (1.526) 
Income -0.294* -0.149 
 
(0.160) (0.111) 
GDP 2010 -0.0244 -0.619 
 
(0.726) (0.443) 
Wave 2010 -1.023 3.550** 
 
(1.620) (1.330) 





 Observations 984 981 
R-squared 0.010 0.049 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Beijing distance numbers are reported in 
units of kilometers. Sex is a dummy variable for which 1 means female and 0 means 
male. Income and GDP 2010 numbers are reported in units of 10,000 RMB. Wave 2010 
is a dummy variable for which 1 means the 2010 study and 0 means the 2012 study. 
 
From the above discussion, we have ruled out three possible 
alternative explanations to the rice culture theory. Although there may be 
some other explanations, we think the rice culture theory is the most 
plausible one, since it indeed confirms our daily intuition and the main 
predictions in previous literature. 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
Wide regional differences in cooperative behavior are observed in 
China. We have used a unique experimental economics data set to test 
the new theory of rice culture. In addition, we have used China Family 
Panel Studies (CFPS), a national survey data, to examine more broad 
measures related with cooperative behavior. The results from both data 
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sets suggest that people from regions with a higher rice farming ratio tend 
to display more cooperative behavior. These results appear to confirm the 
rice culture theory. 
The rice culture theory is a promising hypothesis that links 
people’s living and working environmental conditions to their local cultures 
and real behaviors. It also offers a new perspective to understand how rice 
culture influences other behaviors such as risk taking and competitiveness. 
We will continue to explore this theory in future studies. 
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2.5 Appendix 
 
2.5.1 Appendix A: Instructions for Behavioral Experiments 
 
Modified Dictator Game 
In this situation, Person A is endowed a fixed amount of money, and is asked what 
amount of money he/she wants to send to Person B. Person B makes no decision. 
The amount of money Person A sends to Person B will be multiplied by a factor 
R. That is, Person B will receive R dollars for every dollar sent by Person A. The 
amounts that Person A and Person B receive depend solely on how Person A 
decides to allocate the money.  
Example 1 (Endowed with $50; factor R = 2): Person A can either keep all $50, 
keep some and send the balance, or send all of $50 to an anonymous and 
randomly matched Person B. For every dollar sent by Person A, Person B will 
receive $2. If Person A keeps $50 and sends $0, Person B will receive $0 while 
Person A will keep $50. If Person A sends all $200, Person Person B will receive 
$200 x 2 = $400 while Person A will have $0.  
Example 2: (Endowed with $120; factor R = 1/3): Person A can send up to $120. 
Person B receives $1/3 for every dollar sent by Person A. 
Your decision as Person A: For each of the 5 cases below, please indicate the 
amount you would keep and the amount you would send. In each case, the sum of 
the amount of money you keep and the amount to be sent must equal your 
endowed amount as shown in the final column. 






Amount Kept  Amount Sent 
 
Total 
1 $160 2   $160 
2 $80 3   $80 
3 $160 1/2   $160 
4 $240 1/3   $240 
5 $120 1   $120 
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Trust Game 
Person A is endowed with $80 while Person B is endowed with no money. Person 
A has the option to send any part of $80 to Person B. The money Person A sends 
to person B is tripled; That is, for every $1 Person A sends, Person B receives $3. 
After receiving the tripled amount from Person A, Person B will have the option to 
send to Person A any part of the tripled amount received. The payoffs of Person A 
and Person B are given by: 
Person A: $20 – Amount sent to Person B + Amount received from Person B  
Person B: Tripled amount received from Person A – Amount sent to Person A   
 
Your decision as Person A: Amount to be sent to Person B is $____ (an integer 
between 0 and 20 inclusive). 
 
Your decision as Person B: For each possible sum of money which Person A 
might send to you, you would send the amount as indicated below to Person A. 
Sent by A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Tripled 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60 
Send to A                                         
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Sequential Game 
Person A can choose either LEFT or RIGHT as illustrated in the diagram below. 
Contingent on each of Person A’s 2 possible decisions – LEFT and RIGHT, 
Person B can choose between LEFT and RIGHT. Together, the choices of Person 
A and Person B determine each person’s payoff as shown. If both choose LEFT, 
they each receive $120. If both choose RIGHT, they each receive $68. If Person A 
chooses RIGHT and B chooses LEFT, the payoffs are $140 and $60 respectively. If 
Person A chooses LEFT and B chooses RIGHT, the payoffs are $60 and $140 
respectively. 
 
                             A: $120                    A: $60    A: $140          A: $68 
                             B: $120         B: $140    B: $60           B: $68 
Before making your decisions please examine the above diagram. Please tick (√) 
your decisions -- LEFT or RIGHT – below.  
 
Your decision as Person A:         
   LEFT     RIGHT 
Your decision as Person B if Person A had chosen LEFT:      LEFT 
   RIGHT 
Your decision as Person B if Person A had chosen RIGHT:     LEFT 
   RIGHT 
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Public Goods Game 
Both Person A and Person B are endowed with $80. Each decides how much of 
$80 (between $0 to $80 inclusive) to deposit into a common pool and how much to 
keep. The deposits from both persons into the pool will be multiplied by 1.6. After 
both have made their deposit decisions without knowing each other’s decisions, the 
amount in the pool (after multiplication by 1.6) will be divided equally between the 
both persons.  
There are two parts to each participant’s earning: 
• Your endowment of $80 minus your deposit to the pool. 
• The person’s share of the common pool, i.e., half of 1.6 x total deposits by 
both persons.  
 
Illustrative exercises (Answer key at bottom of page). Here are some exercises to 
help you understand the decision situation. 
1. Both deposit zero to the pool. Person A’s earnings is _____. Person B’s earnings 
is _____. 
2. Both persons deposit $80 to the pool. Person A’s earnings is ____, Person B’s 
earnings is _____. Notice that Persons A and B have symmetric roles. 
 
 
After the decision sheets have been collected, your earnings will be computed 
based on both your decision and the other participant’s decision.  
 
Your decision as Person A: I will deposit _______ (between $0 and $20 inclusive) 
to the common pool.  
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Risk Task 
This situation involves your guessing the color – red or black – of a card drawn 
randomly from a deck of 20 cards, comprising 10 black cards and 10 red cards.  
Option A: You guess the color – black or red – and then draw a card from the deck 
of 20 cards. If you make a correct guess, you receive $60; otherwise, you receive 
nothing. That is: 50% chance of receiving $60 and 50% chance of receiving $0. 
The Option B column lists 10 amounts (displayed in an ascending manner) each 
corresponding to what you will receive for sure if you choose this option.  
DECISION: For each of the 10 rows, please indicate your decision in the final 
column with a tick (√). 
 Option A Option B Decision 
1 50% of receiving $240, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $60 for sure A     B   
2 50% of receiving $240, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $76 for sure A     B   
3 50% of receiving $240, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $92 for sure A     B   
4 50% of receiving $240, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $100 for sure A     B   
5 50% of receiving $240, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $108 for sure A     B   
6 50% of receiving $240, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $116 for sure A     B   
7 50% of receiving $240, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $120 for sure A     B   
8 50% of receiving $240, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $124 for sure A     B   
9 50% of receiving $240, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $132 for sure A     B   
10 50% of receiving $240, 50% of receiving $0 Receiving $140 for sure A     B   
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2.5.2 Appendix B: First Stage Results of Instrumental Regression for 




   VARIABLES Percent of Paddy Percent of Paddy 
      










   Observations 1022 965 
F-stat 1475.1 413.15 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Controls include Sex, Income, GDP 2010, 
and Wave 2010. Sex is a dummy variable for which 1 means female and 0 means male. 
Income and GDP 2010 numbers are reported in units of 10,000 RMB. Wave 2010 is a 
dummy variable for which 1 means the 2010 study and 0 means the 2012 study. F-stat is 
the F statistic of the first stage result in the instrumental regression. 
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2.5.3 Appendix C: Results of Trustworthiness in the Trust Game 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
     VARIABLES Slope Slope Intercept Intercept 
          
Percent of 
paddy 
-0.0150 -0.00710 -0.125 -0.178 
(0.0164) (0.0232) (0.219) (0.286) 
Sex -0.0167 -0.0167 -0.0654 -0.0655 
 
(0.0128) (0.0125) (0.215) (0.210) 
Family income -0.00345*** -0.00347*** 0.00789 0.00800 
 
(0.00103) (0.00101) (0.0152) (0.0149) 
GDP 2010 -0.00224 -0.00222 -0.00147 -0.00158 
 
(0.00358) (0.00355) (0.0473) (0.0463) 
Wave 2010 0.0290** 0.0290*** -0.0119 -0.0122 
 
(0.0108) (0.0106) (0.165) (0.162) 
Constant 0.467*** 0.465*** -2.638*** -2.622*** 
 
(0.0222) (0.0234) (0.249) (0.258) 
     Observations 946 946 946 946 
R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Slope is the slope of the regression line of 
trustee’s return money on the received money. Intercept is the intercept of the regression 
line of trustee’s return money on the received money. Sex is a dummy variable for which 
1 means female and 0 means male. Income and GDP 2010 numbers are reported in 
units of 10,000 RMB. Wave 2010 is a dummy variable for which 1 means the 2010 study 
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Chapter 3 
Does the Stake Size Matter in Penalty Kick? 
- An Experimental Investigation of the Two-Stage 
Matching Pennies Game9 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Mixed strategy equilibrium is the cornerstone of game theory. A 
special family of finite games, the matching pennies game, has been 
widely adopted in empirical tests of the predictions of mixed strategy 
equilibrium. The reasons are twofold (Colin Camerer, 2003): (1) there  are 
no equilibrium selection issues since it has a unique mixed strategy 
equilibrium, and (2) the concern of social preference is minimized due to 
the zero-sum payoff structure. 
Mark Walker and John Wooders (2001) have pioneered the realm 
of using data from sports games to test the prediction of mixed strategy 
equilibrium. Upon analyzing the data from tennis championship series, 
they found that the players’ frequencies of choosing which side to serve 
the ball are consistent with the predictions of mixed strategy equilibrium. 
Ignacio Palacios-Huerta (2003) further explored data of penalty kicks in 
football games, concluding that the players’ frequencies of choosing which 
side to kick the ball in a penalty are in agreement with the prediction of the 
mixed strategy equilibrium. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  This is a joint work with Soo Hong Chew and Bin Miao. We thank the comments and 
suggestions from Roy Chen, Xing Zhang, Changcheng Song, and Songfa Zhong.	  
	   90	  
Both the tennis game and penalty kick game are endowed with a 
matching-penny structure; hence the results in both Mark Walker and John 
Wooders (2001) and Ignacio Palacios-Huerta (2003) provide strong 
evidence for mixed strategy equilibrium in the field. It is noteworthy that 
the above two studies have assumed expected utility when deriving the 
predictions of mixed strategy equilibrium. But sports games usually involve 
not only strategic uncertainty but also objective risks. For example, it is not 
guaranteed that the penalty taker in a football game can obtain a positive 
payoff even when the goal keeper chooses the wrong side, since there 
remains a possibility that the penalty taker may fail to goal. This suggests 
that sports games have a two-stage structure. Consider the following 
representative two-stage matching-penny style game between a pursuer 
and an evader: 




Red 1/3    ($x, $0) 2/3    ($0, $x)  ($0, $x) 
Black ($0, $x) 2/3    ($x, $0) 1/3    ($0, $x) 
 
In Figure 3.1 the payoffs are not deterministic given the specific 
strategy profile of the two players. Notice that given a mixed strategy 
pR+(1-p)B of the pursuer, choosing the pure strategy Red results in a 
compound lottery for the evader, i.e. a p  probability of obtaining a simple 
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lottery (1/3,0; 2/3,x) and a (1-p) probability  of obtaining a degenerate 
lottery (1,x). Similarly, choosing the pure strategy Black results in a 
compound lottery delivering (1, x) with a p probability and (2/3, 0; 1/3, x) 
with probability (1-p). Expected utility assumes reduction for compound 
lotteries, and the resultant mixed strategy equilibrium under expected 
utility does not depend on the value of x, which is (2/3R+1/3B, 2/3R+1/3B).  
This prediction of stake-size independent equilibrium has been 
challenged by Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath (1999). They argue that 
stake size may have an effect in sports games as football game players 
tend to choose a ‘safer’ strategy in important games compared with 
unimportant ones. By reducing compound lotteries, players do not 
differentiate strategic uncertainty from objective risk. There has been 
evidence (Robin Chark and Soo Hong Chew, 2013)  attesting to the fact 
that players distinguish games involving strategic uncertainty from those 
involving objective risk. In this regard, the prediction of expected utility in 
two-stage games remains questionable. In particular, Simon Grant et al. 
(2001) have shown that the recursive expected utility theory, which allows 
distinct expected utilities in evaluating different orders of risks in 
compound lotteries, can generate a stake-size dependent mixed strategy 
equilibrium in two-stage games. 
In this study, we have experimentally investigated the stake-size 
effect in two-stage games, and found that the frequencies of strategies 
vary as a function of the stake size. Therefore, our results suggest against 
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reduction and the expected utility theory, and further elucidate the 
empirical literature on mixed strategy equilibrium. In particular, our results 
imply that the prediction of the mixed strategy equilibrium under expected 
utility in the field remains valid only if it is robust to the variation of stake 
sizes, i.e. the predictions of mixed strategy equilibrium hold even after 
differentiating the data between ‘important’ games and ‘unimportant’ 
games when analyzing the data of sports games from the field. 
Some other experimental studies have also explored the mixed 
strategy equilibrium. Ignacio Palacios‐Huerta and Oscar Volij (2008), in 
their comparison of the performance of professional football players with 
that of students, shown that the former behave according to the prediction 
of the mixed strategy equilibrium whereas the latter do not. With the same 
data set, John Wooders (2010) pointed out that the subjects’ individual 
behaviors were inconsistent with the theory. Steven D. Levitt et al. (2010), 
in examining the Poker player’s performance in the mixed strategy 
equilibrium, found that the students behave even more closely to the 
prediction of mixed strategy equilibrium. 
Experimentally, Barry O'Neill (1987) has used a two-outcome 
design with the risk-attitude free equilibrium, and the results accord well 
with the theoretical predictions at the group level. Some follow-up studies 
(James N Brown and Robert W Rosenthal, 1990, Jacob K Goeree et al., 
2003, Jack Ochs, 1995) have pointed out that there are many behavioral 
biases for human subjects and that people’s behaviors, especially at the 
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individual level, are inconsistent with the prediction of the theory: the 
frequency of the actions deviates from the theory, and autocorrelation 
arises among the actions across the time. Robert W Rosenthal et al. 
(2003) compared people’s behaviors in the equivalent deterministic game 
and random game, and found their behaviors differ systematically. 
There is a body of literature on the stake size effect in the 
experimental games. With a lottery-choice experiment, Charles A Holt and 
Susan K Laury (2002) have shown that a high stake size  renders people 
more risk averse. For the ultimatum game, many studies have reported 
that respondents do not change their behavior significantly as the stakes 
increase (Lisa A Cameron, 1999, Bertrand Munier and Costin Zaharia, 
2002, Robert Slonim and Alvin E Roth, 1998), while Andersen etc. (2011) 
have provided a positive stake size effect. For some tasks with 
performance-contingent payments, Dan Ariely et al. (2009) have found 
that under extreme high incentives, people’s performance level even 
decreases. Compared with this literature, our study is more closely 
connected with theoretical predictions - specifically the stake size effect in 
the situation of strategic interactions.  
3.2 Experimental Design 
We adopt a two-stage matching penny game as shown in Figure 
2.1, in which a particular strategy profiles yields lotteries on the payoffs for 
the players. This game appears in Robert W Rosenthal, Jason Shachat 
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and Mark Walker (2003), Ignacio Palacios‐Huerta and Oscar Volij (2008),  
and Steven D. Levitt, John A. List and David H. Reiley (2010). 
Three players are involved in the game, one pursuer, one evader 
and one judge. The pursuer and the evader choose either red or black 
poker cards simultaneously, and the judge determines the final payoffs by 
throwing a die. For example, when both players choose red cards, the 
judge will throw a six-side die. If the outcome of the die is 1 or 2, the 
pursuer will get x and the evader 0; if otherwise, the evader will get x and 
the pursuer 0.10 
We adopt a within-subject design with two levels of stake sizes, 
RMB 5 and RMB 100. For each stake size, the game is played 100 rounds. 
In order to control for the order effect, we have conducted the experiment 
in two different ordering with the lower stake size appearing first and the 
higher stake size appearing later. In the low-stake-first treatment, the 
subjects first play the game with the stake size of RMB 5 for 100 rounds 
and then with the stake size of RMB 100 for another 100 rounds; in the 
high-stake-first treatment, the order is reversed.  
In the experiment, the role of each subject was randomly 
determined before the experiment began and was unchanged throughout 
the experiment. At the end, each pair of pursuer and evader was paid 
based on his or her randomly selected decisions in the game in addition to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Appendix A5 for detailed experimental instructions. 
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the RMB 30 show-up fee. One decision is selected for one stake size 
using die. The judge received a fixed payment of RMB 40. 
A total of 123 undergraduates from the Shanghai University of 
Finance and Economics were recruited as the participants using online 
advertisement. The experiment, comprising 4 sessions with around 30 
subjects in each session, was conducted by the authors with a research 
assistant. There were 63 subjects for the low-stake-first treatment and 60 
for the high-stake-first treatment. Upon arrival, the subjects were given the 
consent form approved by the Institutional Review Board of the National 
University of Singapore. Subsequently, general instructions were read to 
the subjects followed by our demonstration of several examples. Most 
subjects completed the tasks within 40 minutes. The payment stage took 
about 10 minutes. 
3.3 Theoretical predictions 
This section analyzes the theoretical implications of reduction 
axiom on two-stage games. Consider the two-stage game in Figure 1.  
The pursuer choosing action Red with a 𝑝 probability yields the following 
two compound lotteries for the evader when choosing Red (R) and Black 
(B) respectively: 
Choosing R: 𝑝 probability of receiving !! , 0;   !! , 𝑥  and 1− 𝑝 
probability of receiving 1, 𝑥 ; 
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Choosing B: 𝑝 probability of receiving 1, 𝑥  and 1− 𝑝 probability of 
receiving !! , 0;   !! , 𝑥 . 
Similarly, the evader choosing action Red with a 𝑞 probability 
yields the following two compound lotteries for the pursuer when choosing 
Red and Black respectively: 
Choosing R: 𝑞 probability of receiving !! , 0;   !! , 𝑥  and 1− 𝑞 
probability of receiving 1,0 ; 
Choosing B: 𝑞 probability of receiving 1,0  and 1− 𝑞 chance of 
receiving !! , 0;   !! , 𝑥 . 
With reduction, the evader chooses R to obtain !! , 0;   1− !! , 𝑥 , 
and chooses B to obtain !!!!! , 0;   !!!!! , 𝑥 , whereas the pursuer chooses 
R to obtain 1− !! , 0;   !! , 𝑥 , and chooses B to obtain !!!!! , 0;   !!!!! , 𝑥 . The 
game permits the following unique mixed strategy equilibrium: 𝑝∗ = !! and 𝑞∗ = !!. 
Note that this equilibrium is independent of risk attitudes. In fact, 
the equilibrium remains robust under a broader class of utility functions, 
namely stochastic dominance. The reason is that there are only two 
outcomes 0 and 𝑥; equivalence between the two lotteries !! , 0;   1− !! , 𝑥  
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and !!!!! , 0;   !!!!! , 𝑥  implies !! = !!!!!  as long as the utility function 
satisfies stochastic dominance.11  
Under the general class of utilities, a further implication is that the 
equilibrium is invariant to the change of 𝑥. Thus, an observation of the 
stake-size dependent mixed strategy equilibrium would imply either the 
failure of stochastic dominance or reduction axiom. 
As dominance is relatively a weak assumption, we proceed to 
consider the implications of models with non-reduction on the stake-size 
effect. In particular, we consider two-stage expected utility (David M Kreps 
and Evan L Porteus, 1978) in evaluating compound lotteries.  
Given a compound lottery 𝑝, !! , 0;   !! , 𝑥 ;   1− 𝑝, 1, 𝑥 , the 
evaluation of two-stage expected utility is 𝑝𝑣 !!𝑢 0 + !!𝑢 𝑥 + 1−𝑝 𝑣 𝑢 𝑥 , where 𝑣 is the stage-1 expected utility index and 𝑢 is the stage-
2 expected utility index. Therefore, 𝑢 and 𝑣 encapsulate the attitudes 
towards objective risk and towards strategic uncertainty, respectively.  
In the case that 𝑢(  ) and 𝑣(  ) are identical, the decision maker 
does not differentiate the two sources of uncertainty and the utility function 
reduces to expected utility. 
Under two-stage expected utility, the equilibrium strategy 𝑝∗ is 
determined by the following equation  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This class of utility functions includes expected utility, quadratic utility, betweenness 
and rank-dependent utility. We later analyze QRE, which does not satisfy stochastic 
dominance. 
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𝑝𝑣 13𝑢 0 + 23𝑢 𝑥 + 1− 𝑝 𝑣 𝑢 𝑥  
= 𝑝𝑣 𝑢 𝑥 + 1− 𝑝 𝑣 23𝑢 0 + 13𝑢 𝑥  
For the simplicity of analysis, we normalize 𝑢 0 = 0 and 𝑢 𝑥 = 𝑎, 
and we have the following 𝑝𝑣 !! 𝑎 + 1− 𝑝 𝑣 𝑎 = 𝑝𝑣 𝑎 + 1− 𝑝 𝑣 !! 𝑎 , 
which can be rewritten as 
!!!! = ! ! !!(!!!)! !!! !!(!!!). 
Similarly, we have  
!!!! = ! !!!! !!! . 
The equilibrium (𝑝∗, 𝑞∗) depends on the curvature of 𝑣, and we 
shall have the stake-size variant equilibrium if, for example, 𝑣 is not 
homogeneous.  
Some other two-stage utility specifications that do not admit 
reduction of compound lotteries can also generate the stake-size 
dependent equilibrium. We do not discuss them in details here since we 
aim to identify the qualitative stake-size effect rather than to provide exact 
predictions on the directions of the effect. 
On the other side, it is also possible to have the stake-size effect in 
the absence of stochastic dominance for simple lotteries. Next, we 
consider, for example, the predictions of quantal response equilibrium 
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(Richard D McKelvey and Thomas R Palfrey, 1995). The theory assumes 
choice errors in equilibrium, and admits a logit form of choice probability. 
The quantal equilibrium is determined by the following system of 
equations12: 
𝑝 = 𝑒!(!!!) (𝑒!(!!!) + 𝑒!(!! !!! )) ,𝑞 = 𝑒!(!!!! !!! ) (𝑒!(!!!! !!! ) + 𝑒!(!!!! !!! )) 
Here 𝜆 is a parameter that measures the degree of errors that may 
be made by a decision maker when choosing the equilibrium strategy; a 
higher 𝜆 implies a lower rate of choice errors that may be made by the 
decision maker. The system approaches Nash equilibrium as 𝜆 becomes 
increasingly close to infinity. Figure 3.2 plots the quantal response 
equilibrium with respect to variation in 𝜆 generated by Gambit (Richard D. 
McKelvey et al., 2014). 
Figure 3.2 Quantal Response Equilibrium with Variation in 𝝀  
 
Notes: The horizontal axis is the value of 𝜆, and the vertical axis is the frequency of 
choosing red cards of players. The two arrows in the figure show the frequency of 
choosing red cards for the pursuer and the evader correspondingly. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Here we normalize the prize in each period as x=1 Yuan.  
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One immediate implication of the quantal response equilibrium is 
that it is stake-size dependent, since changes in the stake sizes have the 
same effect as changes in 𝜆 in the system of equations. In particular, an 
increase in the stake sizes is the same as an increase in 𝜆, which leads to 
an observation that is closer to the Nash equilibrium.  
3.4 Results 
 
Table A1 in appendix outlines the frequencies of choosing Red for 
each pursuer and evader by different stake sizes13. Session 1 and 2 
correspond to the high-stake-first treatment, while Session 3 and 4 
correspond to the low-stake-first treatment. The third and fourth columns 
are the frequencies for the pursuer choosing red cards in the first 100 
rounds and the remaining 100 rounds, and so are the sixth and seventh 
columns for the evader.  
Overall, we observe the following stylized patterns. 
3.4.1 Equilibrium Frequencies and the Stake Size Effect 
From Table A1, we notice that the subjects’ frequencies of 
choosing red cards vary considerably, many of which deviate from the 
expected utility equilibrium prediction of 2/3. In addition, a simple t test of 
the two stake size treatments in Column 5 and 8 of Table 3 demonstrates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  4 pairs of players didn’t understand the game properly or didn’t want to seriously play – 
they almost always chose red cards in the whole treatment. When we compare the group 
level choice frequencies, we delete them and focus on our discussion on the normal 
behavior. In appendix, we also show the results with all the subjects. 
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a statistically significant stake-size effect for 11 out of 41 pursuers and 9 
out of 41 evaders. 
We test the stake size effect at the group level. Analysis of data 
from all the 4 sessions according to their stake size yields the insight that 
both the pursuer and the evader exhibit the treatment effect of stake size, 
which is statistically significant under the paired t test and the Wilcoxon 
test from Table 3.1. Notice that the overall comparison has cancelled out 
the possible order effect. From Table 3.114, in Sessions 1 and 2, the 
frequency (at the group level) of choosing red cards increases from the 
low stake size treatment to high stake size treatment for both the pursuer 
and the evader, which are statistically significant. In the reverse order 
Sessions 3 and 4, the pattern is similar though not statistically significant. 
















All Pursuer 0.5141 0.5646 0.0034 0.0063 
All Evader 0.5973 0.6284 0.0569 0.0309 
1, 2 Pursuer 0.512 0.575 0.0016 0.0019 
1, 2 Evader 0.604 0.653 0.0407 0.0418 
3, 4 Pursuer 0.5165 0.5524 0.2339 0.4925 
3, 4 Evader 0.5894 0.5994 0.6419 0.3307 
 
In the first 100 rounds, the frequency (at the group level) of 
choosing red cards is below 2/3 whereas, in the later 100 rounds, they will 
approach but not arrive at 2/3. This suggests a learning effect. To mitigate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  In Appendix 3.7.3, we show the group level frequency data with all the subjects 
including the 4 pairs of outliers. We still find a clear stake-size effect for the pursuer.	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the influence of the learning effect, we also performed a between-subject 
comparison between the frequency of choosing red cards in the first 100 
rounds of Session 1 and 2 with that in the Session 3 and 4. The first 
column in Table 3.215 shows the p value of the t test between the first 100 
rounds in Session 1 and 2 with that in Session 3 and 4.  The pursuer 
chooses red cards with a frequency of 0.512 in the low stake size 
treatment but with a frequency of 0.5524 in the high stake size treatment, 
both of which are statistically significant with p = 0.0142 in the t test. 
Conversely, the evader chooses red cards with a frequency of 
approximately 0.6 in both treatments (0.604 in Session 1 and 2 and 
0.5994 in Session 3 and 4), both of which are statistically insignificant.  
For the remaining 100 rounds, we observed a pronounced treatment 
effect. The pursuer chooses red cards with a frequency 0.575 in Sessions 
1 and 2 and with a frequency of 0.5165 in Sessions 3 and Session 4; 
similarly, the evader chooses red cards with a frequency of 0.653 in 
Sessions 1 and Session 2 and a frequency of 0.5894 in Sessions 3 and 4; 
they are both significant with a p < 0.001 in the t test. 
Table 3.2 Between Subject Comparison 
 
  
First 100 rounds of 
Session 1, Session 2  
vs. Session 3, Session 4 
Remaining 100 rounds of 
Session 1, Session 2  
vs. Session 3, Session 4 
Pursuer 0.0142 0.0004 
Evader 0.7764 0.0001 
Notes: the number in each cell is the p-value of the t test. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  In Appendix 3.7.4, we show the between subject comparison with all the subjects 
including the 4 pairs of outliers. We still find a clear stake-size effect for the pursuer.	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3.4.2 Asymmetry of Player Roles 
Figure 3.3 plots the frequency of choosing red cards in each 20 
periods, and this gives us the information of their learning dynamics. It is 
noteworthy that the Evader chooses red cards with a higher frequency 
across time in almost all the four experimental sessions. This asymmetric 
behavior between the two roles has also been observed by Robert W 
Rosenthal, Jason Shachat and Mark Walker (2003). 
Figure 3.3 Learning Dynamics 
 
 
3.4.3 Serial Correlation 
Negative serial correlation is widely observed in laboratory data 
(Jack Ochs, 1995) and field data (Mark Walker and John Wooders, 2001), 
and it is widely believed to be due to people’s behavioral bias on random 
events (Colin Camerer, 2003). Robert W Rosenthal, Jason Shachat and 
Mark Walker (2003) have found strong positive serial correlations in this 
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experimental game. In Table A2 in Appendix, much heterogeneity is 
observed for our subjects on serial correlations: both positive and negative 
correlations are observed, and many of which are statistically significant. 
This pattern corroborates the findings from previous studies and attributes 
the observed serial correlation to randomness of bias in human cognition. 
Since our main theoretical predictions focus on the frequency of choice 
rather than on serial correlation, we will not discuss it further here. 
3.5 Discussion 
 
The standard expected utility theory gives rise to several sharp 
predictions in the two-stage matching pennies game: (1) the equilibrium 
frequency should equal 2/3; (2) there is no stake size effect; and (3) there 
is no serial correlation across time. The inferences drawn from our data, 
however, reject all these predictions. This implies a failure of expected 
utility in this situation, and suggests that the observed patterns in choice 
frequencies can be accounted for by relaxing some assumptions in 
expected utility, i.e., reduction of compound lotteries and stochastic 
dominance. It leads to the two theory candidates – the recursive expected 
utility theory and the quantal response equilibrium, respectively. 
As regards the stake size effect, the recursive expected utility 
theory yields a clear prediction if the subject has some utility functional 
forms whereas the quantal response equilibrium predicts that the 
equilibrium frequency will be closer to the Nash equilibrium in the high 
stake size treatment than that in the low stake size treatment. The intuition	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is that, when the subjects face a high stake size prize, they may make less 
random error since the cost is higher compared with those in the low stake 
size treatment. 
For the fact that the observed equilibrium frequency doesn’t equal 
to 2/3, as it is shown in Section 3.3 the recursive expected utility theory 
could explain it. The quantal response equilibrium predicts that the 
equilibrium frequency of the pursuer is below 2/3 and the evader doesn’t 
equal to 2/3 in most of the cases. 
A pattern of asymmetric equilibrium frequency is also observed: 
the pursuer chose the red cards with a higher frequency than the evader 
did in all the sessions. The recursive expected utility theory has no specific 
prediction but can explain it with specific functional form; while the quantal 
response equilibrium provides an exact sharp prediction on this. 
As regards the serial correlation, neither the quantal response 
equilibrium nor the recursive expected utility theory provides predictions. 
The quantal response equilibrium are used to explain the learning effect if 
we permit the randomness parameter λ to increase across time. There is a 
learning effect in our data, and the quantal response equilibrium fares 
better in that capacity. 
Table 3.3 summarizes the aforesaid discussion.  The overall notion 
is that the quantal response equilibrium seems to be better at explaining 
the multiplicity of patterns in our experimental data, in addition to 
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meritoriously using fewer parameters and to concisely organizing several 
patterns in the data. 
Table 3.3 Comparisons of Theories and Evidence 
 







































To measure the quantitative effect of the stake size effect, we 
estimated the quantal response equilibrium model with maximum 
likelihood method. We normalized the matching penny game payoff in 
each round as 1 Yuan for both low and high stake size treatment. The 
QRE model’s log likelihood function is  
log 𝐿 =    [𝑦!" ∗ log 𝑝 𝜆   +!!!! 1− 𝑦!" ∗ log 1− 𝑝 𝜆   +𝑦!" ∗ log 𝑞 𝜆  + 1− 𝑦!"    ∗ log 1− 𝑞 𝜆   ], 
where 𝑦!"   and 𝑦!"  is the choice dummy of red cards for the pursuer and 
the evader respectively; 𝑝 and 𝑞 comes from the following nonlinear 
simultaneous equation system 
𝑝 = 𝑒!(!!!) (𝑒!(!!!) + 𝑒!(!! !!! )) ,𝑞 = 𝑒!(!!!! !!! ) 𝑒! !!!! !!! + 𝑒! !!!! !!! . 
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In order to estimate the treatment effect, we let λ = 𝑏! + 𝑏! ∗𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒. Here 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 is the treatment dummy in which 1 means 
high stake treatment and 0 means low stake treatment. The following 
Table 3.4 shows the estimation results. The constant 𝑏! is 2.1516 and the 
treatment coefficient 𝑏! is 3.7879, and both are significantly at 1% level. 
This implies that for the low stake size treatment, the purser’s predicted 
frequency of choosing red is 0.4672, and the evader’s is 0.6057; for the 
high stake size treatment, the Purser’s is 0.5329, and the evader’s is 
0.6888. 





 𝑏!  2.1516 ***  0.2320 	  𝑏!  3.7879 ***  0.7446 




In our examination of the stake-size effect in a two-stage matching 
pennies game, we have found evidence against the predictions of the 
expected utility theory for the mixed strategy equilibrium. In addition, we 
have demonstrated that the two-stage expected utility theory and the 
quantal response equilibrium theory can account for the effect by relaxing 
some properties of expected utility theory, including reduction of 
compound lotteries and stochastic dominance. Our results have further 
implications for the field studies on mixed strategy equilibrium; in 
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particular, our results suggest the need to differentiate between different 
stake sizes in the field. Lastly, we would like to point out we utilize the 
stake-size independence property of two-stage games under expected 
utility theory in this study; some other properties of two-stage games are 
also of interest in the empirical study – for example, the manipulation of 
the stage-2 lotteries for different players to have different correlation 
structures for analysis of the impact of social preference on equilibrium. 
This new topic warrants further investigations in our future studies. 
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3.7 Appendix 
 

















1	   101	   0.3	   0.44	   0.0405**	   0.51	   0.53	   0.7785	  
1	   102	   0.41	   0.36	   0.47	   0.56	   0.58	   0.7765	  
1	   103	   0.49	   0.56	   0.324	   0.64	   0.65	   0.8833	  
1	   104	   0.54	   0.74	   0.0031***	   0.78	   0.71	   0.2583	  
1	   105	   0.52	   0.65	   0.0626*	   0.6	   0.65	   0.4677	  
1	   106	   0.47	   0.67	   0.0041***	   0.49	   0.59	   0.1575	  
1	   107	   0.51	   0.57	   0.3972	   0.61	   0.65	   0.5603	  
1	   108	   0.51	   0.47	   0.5738	   0.44	   0.79	   0***	  
1	   109	   0.46	   0.53	   0.3246	   0.76	   0.73	   0.6285	  
1	   110	   0.64	   0.61	   0.6632	   0.64	   0.71	   0.293	  
2	   201	   0.74	   0.83	   0.1226	   0.78	   0.82	   0.482	  
2	   202	   0.57	   0.62	   0.4739	   0.66	   0.77	   0.0857*	  
2	   203	   0.47	   0.47	   1	   0.51	   0.48	   0.6732	  
2	   204	   0.46	   0.55	   0.205	   0.54	   0.67	   0.0605*	  
2	   205	   0.66	   1	   0***	   0.74	   0.96	   0***	  
2	   206	   0.65	   0.66	   0.8825	   0.75	   0.84	   0.1161	  
2	   207	   0.44	   0.45	   0.8876	   0.51	   0.5	   0.8882	  
2	   208	   0.52	   0.58	   0.3963	   0.49	   0.45	   0.5732	  
2	   209	   0.5	   0.49	   0.8882	   0.42	   0.61	   0.007***	  
2	   210	   0.53	   0.71	   0.0086***	   0.85	   0.75	   0.0778*	  
2	   211	   0.51	   0.54	   0.6729	   0.54	   0.58	   0.5711	  
3	   301	   0.54	   0.54	   1	   0.72	   0.68	   0.5395	  
3	   302	   0.51	   0.53	   0.7785	   0.5	   0.48	   0.7786	  
3	   303	   0.78	   0.43	   0***	   0.8	   0.58	   0.0007***	  
3	   304	   0.57	   0.63	   0.389	   0.6	   0.63	   0.6648	  
3	   305	   0.44	   0.56	   0.0905*	   0.52	   0.46	   0.3986	  
3	   306	   0.76	   0.56	   0.0027	   0.62	   0.52	   0.1547	  
3	   307	   0.48	   0.51	   0.6732	   0.52	   0.77	   0.0002***	  
3	   308	   0.41	   0.48	   0.3217	   0.53	   0.52	   0.8881	  
3	   309	   0.57	   0.54	   0.6714	   0.69	   0.72	   0.6438	  
3	   310	   0.54	   0.48	   0.3986	   0.73	   0.73	   0.7775	  
4	   401	   0.65	   0.58	   0.3115	   0.54	   0.56	   0.7775	  
4	   402	   0.49	   0.49	   1	   0.45	   0.5	   0.4814	  
4	   403	   0.5	   0.45	   0.4814	   0.54	   0.56	   0.7775	  
4	   404	   0.97	   1	   0.0817	   1	   1	   1	  
4	   405	   0.46	   0.46	   1	   0.62	   0.57	   0.4739	  
4	   406	   0.41	   0.47	   0.3953	   0.6	   0.55	   0.477	  
4	   407	   0.72	   0.5	   0.0013***	   0.63	   0.63	   1	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4	   408	   0.41	   0.99	   0***	   0.58	   0.96	   0***	  
4	   409	   0.56	   0.99	   0***	   0.58	   0.96	   0***	  
4	   410	   0.56	   0.57	   0.8873	   0.58	   0.55	   0.6706	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3.7.2 Appendix Table A2 Serial Correlation Results 
 









1 101 Pursuer -3.6 0 0.55 0.58 
1 101 Evader 3.22 0 2.46 0.01 
1 102 Pursuer -1.74 0.08 -0.45 0.65 
1 102 Evader 1.78 0.08 2.95 0 
1 103 Pursuer 2.42 0.02 -1.69 0.09 
1 103 Evader 1.73 0.08 2.54 0.01 
1 104 Pursuer 2.29 0.02 2.76 0.01 
1 104 Evader 0.49 0.62 -0.29 0.77 
1 105 Pursuer 0.82 0.41 0.55 0.58 
1 105 Evader 1.47 0.14 2.76 0.01 
1 106 Pursuer 1.05 0.3 0.41 0.69 
1 106 Evader 0 1 0.96 0.34 
1 107 Pursuer 0.41 0.68 2.46 0.01 
1 107 Evader 0.93 0.35 -0.33 0.74 
1 108 Pursuer 4.43 0 1.65 0.1 
1 108 Evader -0.67 0.5 0.55 0.58 
1 109 Pursuer -1.96 0.05 -2.99 0 
1 109 Evader -0.96 0.34 -1.9 0.06 
1 110 Pursuer 1.73 0.08 1.99 0.05 
1 110 Evader -1.98 0.05 -5.18 0 
2 201 Pursuer -1.44 0.15 -0.8 0.43 
2 201 Evader -3.62 0 -2.92 0 
2 202 Pursuer -0.41 0.68 -1.95 0.05 
2 202 Evader -1.99 0.05 -1.54 0.12 
2 203 Pursuer 5.28 0 4.27 0 
2 203 Evader -2.01 0.04 -0.39 0.7 
2 204 Pursuer 1.48 0.14 5.58 0 
2 204 Evader 1.48 0.14 0.41 0.69 
2 206 Pursuer -1.22 0.22 1.82 0.07 
2 206 Evader -2.29 0.02 -0.33 0.74 
2 207 Pursuer 1.37 0.17 1.52 0.13 
2 207 Evader -0.2 0.84 -1.61 0.11 
2 208 Pursuer 0.62 0.54 1.3 0.2 
2 208 Evader 2.02 0.04 0.71 0.48 
2 209 Pursuer -2.21 0.03 -1.4 0.16 
2 209 Evader -0.77 0.44 -2.66 0.01 
2 210 Pursuer -2.99 0 -3.96 0 
2 210 Evader -0.6 0.55 0.67 0.5 
2 211 Pursuer 0.41 0.68 2.09 0.04 
2 211 Evader 0.27 0.79 -1.8 0.07 
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3 301 Pursuer 2.29 0.02 1.48 0.14 
3 301 Evader 2.17 0.03 -0.12 0.9 
3 302 Pursuer 3.02 0 0.44 0.66 
3 302 Evader 2.21 0.03 5.65 0 
3 303 Pursuer -3.33 0 2.66 0.01 
3 303 Evader -1.26 0.21 0.47 0.64 
3 304 Pursuer -1.64 0.1 0.94 0.34 
3 304 Evader -0.42 0.68 2.24 0.03 
3 305 Pursuer 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.58 
3 305 Evader 1.22 0.22 0.47 0.64 
3 306 Pursuer 0.97 0.33 2.19 0.03 
3 306 Evader -0.24 0.81 -0.99 0.32 
3 307 Pursuer 0.02 0.99 0.81 0.42 
3 307 Evader 0.22 0.83 0.74 0.46 
3 308 Pursuer -2.16 0.03 -0.59 0.56 
3 308 Evader -0.17 0.87 -1.39 0.16 
3 309 Pursuer 2.46 0.01 2.9 0 
3 309 Evader -1.12 0.26 -3.83 0 
3 310 Pursuer 2.29 0.02 3.64 0 
3 310 Evader 1.43 0.15 2.49 0.01 
4 401 Pursuer 4.53 0 2.53 0.01 
4 401 Evader -0.74 0.46 -0.26 0.46 
4 402 Pursuer 3.42 0 3.22 0 
4 402 Evader 3.55 0 4.02 0 
4 403 Pursuer 0 1 3.76 0 
4 403 Evader 0.06 0.95 0.35 0.73 
4 405 Pursuer 0.38 0.38 -0.14 0.89 
4 405 Evader 2.11 0.03 -0.7 0.01 
4 406 Pursuer -0.7 0.48 0.44 0.66 
4 406 Evader -0.21 0.83 1.12 0.26 
4 407 Pursuer -1.08 0.28 1.01 0.31 
4 407 Evader 0.73 0.47 2.46 0.01 
4 410 Pursuer -0.06 0.95 -0.41 0.68 
4 410 Evader 0.26 0.79 4.16 0 
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Paired t test p-
value 
All Pursuer 0.5526829 0.5812195 0.0091 
All Evader 0.6282927 0.6182927 0.3502 
1, 2 Pursuer 0.5190476 0.5952381 0 
1, 2 Evader 0.6104762 0.667619 0.0001 
3, 4 Pursuer 0.588 0.5665 0.1688 










First 100 rounds 
Session 1 2 vs. Session 3 4 
Second 100 rounds 
Session 1 2 vs. Session 3 4 
Pursuer 0.0023 0.6375 
Evader 0.6444 0.1644 
Notes: the number in each cell is the p-value of the t test. 
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3.7.5 Appendix A5: Instructions for the Experiment16 
You and the person seated next to you will repeatedly play a simple game of 
pursuit and evasion, or "hide and seek".  Your roles have been randomly decided by 
drawing lots – one is the Pursuer, and the other is the Evader. 
When the game begins, each privately chooses his or her color of the card – red 
or black – and puts it on the desk with the colored side facing down for concealment. 
Now, both the Pursuer and the Evader open their cards. If the colors of the 
cards don’t match (one card is red, the other black), the Evader will win, since the 
Pursuer has not found him. On the contrary, if the colors of cards match (both cards are 
red or both are black), the Pursuer finds the Evader, but whether he or she finally wins 
the round depends on the number generated by the throwing a dice. 
In this case, the Judge will throw a dice to get a random number from 1 to 6. 
Notice that each number from 1 to 6 occurs with an equal probability. 
The final outcomes are generated according to the following table: 
 
 If dice is 1 or 2: If dice is 3, 4, 5, or 6: 
If both choose red: The Pursuer wins The Evader wins 
If both choose black: The Evader wins The Pursuer wins 
If one choose red, and the 
other choose black: 
The dice is not thrown.  
The Evader wins 
 
When the winner is decided, the Judge will record the moves and the die 
number, the players' cards will be returned to them, and a new round begins. At this 
stage, the winner will get 5 Yuan. 
The game will last for many rounds. In the first stage of the game, you will 
attend 100 rounds of the game like this; in the second stage, you will attend another 100 
rounds of the similar game with a different payoff. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The original form is in Chinese.	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First, each of you will get 30 Yuan for certain as the show-up fee of the 
experiment. Your additional payoff is determined as follows. Each of two stages of this 
game has 100 rounds. At the end of the experiment, we will randomly draw one of the 
100 rounds and pay you according to the payoff in that period. We will total up your two 
chosen payoffs in the two stages of the game and pay you cash. 
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